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Mobilizing Local Government Law for
Low-Wage Workers
Scott L. Cummings* and Steven A. Boutchert
INTRODUCTION
Over the past decade, stories of the "working poor" have
emerged from the economic margins as a powerful rejoinder to
the claim that the rising tide of American prosperity lifts all
boats.1 The current period of economic crisis has made their vul-
nerability even more severe-while sharpening the contrasting
fortunes of the wealthy. What to do about the persistence and
perilousness of low-wage work has emerged as a central chal-
lenge of contemporary economic reform.
One common diagnosis of the low-wage market is that feder-
al labor and employment laws have failed to protect the rights of
low-wage workers. The deficiencies of federal labor law---codified
in the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA")2-as a framework
for promoting meaningful worker organizing have been exten-
sively documented. Scholars have emphasized that federal labor
law excludes from coverage categories of workers who play im-
portant roles in the contemporary workplace, 3 while also erecting
a structure to govern union elections that tilts decisively in favor
of employers by providing inadequate protection against illegal
employer interference in union campaigns. 4 Employment law, in
turn, has not provided an adequate backstop, particularly for
* Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law.
t Ph.D. Candidate, Department of Sociology, University of California, Irvine.
1 See Barbara Ehrenreich, Nickel and Dimed: On (Not) Getting By in America
(Macmillan 2001); David K. Shipler, The Working Poor: Invisible in America (Knopf
2004). See also Frank Munger, ed, Laboring Below the Line: The New Ethnography of
Poverty, Low-Wage Work, and Survival in the Global Economy (Russell Sage 2002).
2 29 USC §§ 151-69 (2006).
3 For a general discussion, see Nelson Lichtenstein, State of the Union: A Century of
American Labor (Princeton 2002); Katherine V.W. Stone, From Widgets to Digits: Em-
ployment Regulation for the Changing Workplace (Cambridge 2004); Cynthia L. Estlund,
The Ossification of Labor Law, 102 Colum L Rev 1527 (2002).
4 Benjamin I. Sachs, Employment Law as Labor Law, 29 Cardozo L Rev 2685, 2694-
95 (2008).
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those low-wage workers at the bottom of the economic ladder,
many of whom are either excluded from coverage (for example, as
independent contractors) or work for subcontracted firms that
are judgment proof.5 Even for workers technically covered by
employment law, the reality of lax enforcement means that many
aggrieved workers never receive adequate redress. 6
In response, low-wage worker advocates have pursued a va-
riety of strategies. Attempts to meet the regulatory failings on
their own terms through federal legislative reform have received
a chilly political reception.7 Using the tools at hand, labor un-
ions-particularly those associated with the Change to Win coa-
lition-have achieved some notable victories organizing low-wage
service sector workers, with the Los Angeles Justice for Janitors
campaign by the Service Employees International Union
("SEIU") being one of the most prominent examples.8 In addition,
the emergence of non-union organizations, such as immigrant
worker centers and community-labor groups committed to ad-
vancing the rights of low-wage workers, have generated new
grassroots organizing and innovative legal mobilization cam-
paigns designed to organize workers, enhance legal enforcement,
and improve working standards.9
Against this backdrop, scholars have started to examine how
new private and public law frameworks are being fashioned to
support worker organizing outside of the NLRA. Benjamin Sachs
argues that alternative legal frameworks are being forged by the
"hydraulic demand for collective action," which has been
thwarted within the federal labor law system and thus found its
outlet elsewhere: in private agreements, the innovative use of
5 Noah D. Zatz, Working Beyond the Reach or Grasp of Employment Law, in Annette
Bernhardt, et al, eds, The Gloves-Off Economy: Workplace Standards at the Bottom of
America's Labor Market 31 (Cornell 2008).
6 Id.
7 The Obama administration and Democratic Congress offer a new opportunity for
federal labor reform. Organized labor is vigorously pressing a card-check neutrality law,
which would require union certification if a majority of employees sign cards indicating
their intent to join the union-thus bypassing the formal election process that unions
charge is rife with employer abuse.
8 Catherine L. Fisk, Daniel J.B. Mitchell, and Christopher L. Erickson, Union Re-
presentation of Immigrant Janitors in Southern California: Economic and Legal Chal-
lenges, in Ruth Milkman, ed, Organizing Immigrants: The Challenge for Unions in Con-
temporary California 199 (Cornell 2000).
9 See, for example, Janice Fine, Worker Centers: Organizing Communities at the
Edge of the Dream 2 (Cornell 2006); Scott L. Cummings, Law in the Labor Movement's
Challenge to Wal-Mart: A Case Study of the Inglewood Site Fight, 95 Cal L Rev 1927,
1930 (2007).
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federal employment law, and new state and local regulations.10
The state and local responses, in particular, have been shaped by
the doctrine of federal labor preemption, which prohibits the non-
federal regulation of activities covered by the NLRA or left to the
"free play of economic forces."11 Yet state and local governments
have instituted labor organizing policies under exceptions to the
preemption rules, namely when state and local governments
themselves act as employers or when they act in their proprie-
tary capacity by dispensing public subsidies or issuing' con-
tracts. 12
This Article steps back from the focus on local government
laws intended to directly advance union organizing and surveys
the broader range of local initiatives designed to improve condi-
tions in the low-wage work sector-by imposing minimum work
standards, rewarding "good" employers, creating training pro-
grams and pathways to higher-paying jobs, and indirectly facili-
tating worker collective action. Although local governments may
take other steps to improve the quality of life for low-income res-
idents,1 3 the focus of this Article is on how local government law
has been specifically used in efforts to restructure work. For evi-
dence, we draw upon low-wage worker organizing campaigns in
Los Angeles, which have capitalized on dynamic labor leader-
ship, a tradition of occupation-based unionism, and the energy of
immigrant worker organizing to generate innovative models for
revitalizing the labor movement.1 4 These new strategies have
sought to expand unionism, but also to reframe labor activism as
a project that extends beyond union members to touch the lives
of working people more broadly. The effort to broaden the labor
movement has been pursued both as an affirmative union strate-
gy and as a reaction to the emergence of non-union worker activ-
ism-such as immigrant worker organizing-that has contested
the dominance of organized labor.1 5 Community and labor groups
10 Benjamin I. Sachs, Labor Law Renewal, 1 Harv L & Pol Rev 375, 376-77 (2007).
11 Id at 382.
12 Id at 387.
13 Most significantly, local governments pursue a wide range of policies to expand
and protect access to affordable housing. See, for example, Peter Marcuse, To Control
Gentrification: Anti-Displacement Zoning and Planning for Stable Residential Districts,
13 NYU Rev L & Soc Change 931 (1985).
14 See Ruth Milkman, L.A. Story: Immigrant Workers and the Future of the U.S.
Labor Movement 3-4 (Russell Sage 2006). See also Lichtenstein, State of the Union at
266-67 (cited in note 3).
15 See, for example, Jennifer Gordon, Suburban Sweatshops: The Fight for Immigrant
Rights (Harvard 2005).
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have formed alliances to challenge the deterioration of working
conditions in the low-wage sector and connect the struggle
against low-wage work to a broader movement for economic jus-
tice. 16 One outgrowth has been the advent of low-wage worker
initiatives to leverage changes in local government laws as a
means to improve the economic status of the working poor.
This Article examines nine low-wage worker initiatives
launched in Los Angeles between 1997 and 2008. The initiatives
were selected for study because each resulted in, or significantly
relied upon, local government policy as a means to restructure
some sector of the local market for low-wage work.17 Part I of this
Article describes the genesis and features of these initiatives,
and examines how they relate to-and extend-traditional local
government contracting, land use, and regulatory powers. Part II
then frames the key issues presented by the turn to local initia-
tives to promote low-wage worker organizing and improve labor
conditions. Specifically, we explore six central questions raised
by local market interventions on behalf of low-wage workers: (1)
Which groups are promoting the initiatives? (2) Which low-wage
industries are targeted and why? (3) What are the goals of the
community and labor groups supporting the initiatives? (4) How
are the issues framed for political purposes? (5) What are the
impacts of the initiatives on the low-wage market? (6) And what
are the challenges of replicating these initiatives as a national
labor strategy?
I. LOCAL Low-WAGE WORKER INITIATIVES: EVIDENCE FROM
Los ANGELES
The conventional view of local government law sees it pri-
marily as a mechanism for providing essential local services (for
example, police and fire protection), regulating property use, and
promoting economic development. Although scholars have long
noted that local government decision making has profound dis-
tributional impacts,18 local government law has generally not
16 For a general discussion, see Robert Gottlieb, et al, The Next Los Angeles: The
Struggle for a Livable City (California 2005); Scott L. Cummings, Community Economic
Development as Progressive Politics: Toward a Grassroots Movement for Economic Justice,
54 Stan L Rev 399 (2001).
17 Seven of the initiatives have been formalized as local ordinances, one has resulted
in a series of private agreements in connection with publicly subsidized development
projects, and one is still in progress (but aims to produce legislation).
18 See, for example, Richard Thompson Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Political Geo-
graphy in Legal Analysis, 107 Harv L Rev 1843, 1844 (1994). See also Gerald E. Frug,
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played a strong role in restructuring workplace relationships to
the benefit of employees. Low-wage worker initiatives challenge
this convention by taking the traditional tools of local govern-
ment-its contracting, land use, and regulatory powers-and
adapting them to advance workplace reform.19 This Part ex-
amines how this adaptation has worked through descriptions of
the Los Angeles initiatives.
A. The Contracting Model
Local governments not only regulate pursuant to their police
power, they also act as market participants, purchasing goods
and services in the process of governance. This market partici-
pant function takes a variety of forms. Municipalities may con-
tract out services that would otherwise be undertaken directly by
government staff, as in the case of bus transportation or janitori-
al services. In addition, municipalities may award concessions to
private companies, such as airport vendors, to operate businesses
on publicly owned property. Finally, municipalities may pur-
chase supplies, such as uniforms for police officers and firemen,
from private companies.
These market interventions may have direct impacts on the
quality of jobs. For example, to the extent that municipal work-
ers are unionized, outsourcing government services to private
contractors that are not under union contract may lower wages
and benefits for workers performing those services. Similarly,
municipalities seeking the lowest cost suppliers may enter con-
tracts with those companies that reduce labor costs in order to
decrease the price of their bids.
Yet contracting relationships can also be a tool for raising
employment standards in companies that do business with local
governments. 20 This Section focuses on three policies that leve-
rage the city's market power to enhance work standards for pri-
vate employers: the Los Angeles Living Wage Ordinance, which
imposes wage and benefit rates above the federal and state mi-
nimums on companies that receive municipal service and conces-
sion contracts (among other financial benefits); the Los Angeles
Sweat-Free Procurement Ordinance, which sets standards for
City Making: Building Communities Without Building Walls 132-38 (1999).
19 See Clayton P. Gillette, Local Redistribution, Living Wage Ordinances, and Judi-
cial Intervention, 101 Nw U L Rev 1057, 1057-1062 (2007).
20 See Jody Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatization, 116 Harv
L Rev 1285 (2003).
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city garment contractors; and the Los Angeles Port Clean Trucks
Program, which requires trucking companies to treat their driv-
ers as employees as a condition of their concession agreements.
1. Contracting out services: The Los Angeles Living
Wage Ordinance.
The movement for a "living wage" emerged in the 1990s
against the backdrop of declining rates of private sector unioni-
zation, stagnant federal and state minimum wage floors (declin-
ing in real terms), and growing low-wage workforces in many
cities.21 Commentators have viewed the living wage movement as
a way to engage local labor groups in responding to economic in-
equality, rather than as a national solution to low-wage work. 22
Inspired by Baltimore, which first passed a living wage law in
1994, labor and community activists in Los Angeles initiated a
Living Wage Campaign in 1995.23 The campaign was spear-
headed by the Tourism Industry Development Council, which
later changed its name to the Los Angeles Alliance for a New
Economy ("LAANE"). LAANE was formed by the Hotel Em-
ployees and Restaurant Union ("HERE") Local 11 to move
beyond conventional union organizing in order to more effectively
address the growth of low-wage work, particularly in nonunio-
nized hotels. 24 To advance its agenda, LAANE formed a coalition
with a number of local community groups, including the Associa-
tion of Community Organizing for Reform Now ("ACORN"), a
national membership organization focused on progressive gras-
sroots organizing; Esperanza Community Housing Corporation,
an affordable housing developer in the Figueroa Corridor neigh-
borhood south of downtown; and Action for Grassroots Empo-
werment and Neighborhood Development Alternatives
("AGENDA"), an Alinsky-style organizing group working primar-
ily on job development for low-income residents of South Los An-
geles. This coalition, in partnership with the HERE and SEIU
locals, won its first victory in 1996, when it secured an ordinance
that required city service contractors to retain long-term workers
21 Robert Pollin and Stephanie Luce, The Living Wage: Building a Fair Economy 3-6
(New Press 1998).
22 Richard Freeman, Fighting for Other Folks' Wages: The Logic and Illogic of Living
Wage Campaigns, 44 Indus Rel L J 14, 17-18 (2005).
23 Hany Khalil and Sandra Hinson, The Los Angeles Living Wage Campaign, in Pub-
lic Subsidies, Public Accountability: Holding Corporations to Labor and Community
Standards 18 (Grassroots Policy Project 2d ed 1998).
24 Id at 19.
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and provide continuing employment to those who met perfor-
mance standards-a victory that prevented new airport restau-
rant concessionaires like McDonald's from firing long-term work-
ers and paying new workers lower wages.25
Strengthened by this victory, the coalition-which expanded
to include the newly formed Clergy and Laity United for Econom-
ic Justice ("CLUE")-set its sights on pursuing a more ambitious
living wage ordinance. With support from key allies on the Los
Angeles City Council, the coalition ran a media and lobbying
campaign that relied on moral suasion and the results of an em-
pirical study conducted by then-University of California, River-
side economist Robert Pollin to defuse business concerns that a
living wage ordinance would "kill jobs. '26 The Los Angeles Living
Wage Ordinance was passed by the city council in 1997 and be-
came law over the veto of Mayor Richard Riordan. 27
The current version of the ordinance requires employers to
pay minimum compensation (a combination of wages plus health
benefits) adjusted annually for inflation.28 "Employer" is defined
such that the ordinance applies to three broad categories of busi-
nesses with fiscal ties to the city: (1) companies with city service
contracts (and their subcontractors) that are worth more than
$25 thousand and have a term of at least three months; (2) com-
panies with leases or licenses to perform services on city property
(such as airports or parks) and their subcontractors or sublicen-
sees; and (3) companies that receive city "financial assistance"
(such as bond financing, planning assistance, tax increment fi-
nancing, and tax credits) for economic development or job growth
projects, with companies receiving large amounts ($1 million or
more) required to meet living wage obligations for five years,
while those receiving smaller amounts (between $100 thousand
and $1 million) obligated only for one year.29
The Los Angeles Living Wage Ordinance exemplifies the
most common approach to the living wage, which is to tie living
wage compliance to a direct financial relationship between the
25 Id at 20.
26 Id at 24.
27 Id at 25-26. The original Los Angeles Living Wage Ordinance was amended twice.
The 1998 amendment extended coverage to companies with a lease or license of city prop-
erty and added provisions imposing sanctions for retaliation and willful violations. LA
Ordinance No 172336 (Dec 11, 1998). The 2001 amendment made technical changes to
the statutory language. LA Ordinance No 173747 (Jan 18, 2001).
28 LA Admin Code § 10.37.2(a). As of 2008, the living wage was set at $10 per hour
with health benefits or $11.25 per hour without.
29 LA Admin Code § 10.37.1.
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city and private employer. Most living wage laws cover city ser-
vice contractors. 30 The Los Angeles Living Wage Ordinance in-
cludes a less common provision that applies the living wage re-
quirements to subsidy recipients, while also explicitly covering
companies that have subcontracts with city contractors, thus
closing a potential loophole by ensuring that companies cannot
circumvent living wage mandates by adding additional layers of
contracted services. 31 However, the ordinance does exclude les-
sees of subsidy recipients, which means that lessees of publicly
financed development projects, such as retail stores or restau-
rants in shopping malls, are under no obligation to meet city liv-
ing wage requirements. 32 However, as described below, these
workers may be covered by living wage requirements instituted
through city development agreements or private contract.
Since the Los Angeles Living Wage Ordinance was passed,
approximately 125 living wage ordinances have been enacted in
cities and counties across the country.33 These ordinances have
been subject to a variety of legal challenges, with mixed results.34
Business groups have also sought to overturn living wage ordin-
ances via local referenda, arguing that the ordinances will reduce
the number of jobs and injure low-wage workers by causing em-
ployers to hire better-credentialed employees. 3 5 A sizeable litera-
30 David Neumark, How Living Wage Laws Affect Low-Wage Workers and Low-
Income Families 8 (Public Policy Institute of California 2002).
31 LAAdmin Code §§ 10.37, 10.37.1(k).
32 LAAdmin Code § 10.37.1(c).
33 See Living Wage Wins, Living Wage Resource Center, available at <http://
livingwagecampaign.org/index.php?id=1959> (last visited July 18, 2009).
34 Compare New Orleans Campaign for a Living Wage v City of New Orleans, 825 S2d
1098, 1108 (La 2002) (striking down New Orleans's living wage ordinance on state consti-
tutional grounds) with Visiting Homemaker Service of Hudson County v Bd of Chosen
Freeholders, 883 A2d 1074, 1076-77 (NJ Super Ct App Div 2005) (upholding Hudson
County, New Jersey living wage ordinance against state law challenge). In California, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld a federal constitutional chal-
lenge to Berkeley's living wage ordinance, which like the Los Angeles ordinance applied
to city contractors, lessees, and financial assistance recipients. RUI One Corp v City of
Berkeley, 371 F3d 1137, 1141 (9th Cir 2004). The Berkeley ordinance also added a provi-
sion applying living wage requirements to businesses of a certain size operating in the
Berkeley Marina, which the city held in public trust. Id at 1144-46. The Ninth Circuit
upheld the Berkeley ordinance in its entirety, rejecting arguments that it violated (1) the
federal contract clause by impairing existing contracts with businesses in the Marina, (2)
federal and state equal protection clauses by treating Marina businesses differently based
on geographic location, and (3) federal and state due process clauses by impermissibly
delegating legislative power to unions. Id at 1147-48, 1155-57.
35 For an example of a successful referendum to overturn a living wage ordinance, see
Kathleen M. Erskine and Judy Marblestone, The Movement Takes the Lead: The Role of
Lawyers in the Struggle for a Living Wage in Santa Monica, California, in Austin Sarat
and Stuart A. Scheingold, eds, Cause Lawyers and Social Movements, 249, 253-54 (Stan-
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ture has developed to analyze these claims, which are vigorously
contested. The most recent study of the Los Angeles Living Wage
Ordinance, written in collaboration with LAANE, found that it
had increased pay in nearly ten thousand jobs, over half of which
were in the airline service, security, and parking industries.3
6
The study also found that employment reductions were minimal,
approximately 1 percent of all affected jobs, and that most work-
ers affected by the law were low-income. 37
2. Contracting out goods: The Los Angeles Sweat-Free
Procurement Ordinance.
The Los Angeles Living Wage Ordinance excludes employers
bound to the city by a contract for the purchase of goods, as in
the case where the city purchases food, uniforms, or other sup-
plies for city employees. 38 However, city contracts for the pur-
chase of goods may also create opportunities to leverage the gov-
ernment's purchasing power to exact concessions from suppliers.
Most obviously, the city can bargain to lower the price of goods
purchased in bulk. Yet price is only one aspect of the purchasing
relationship. Municipalities can also use their market power to
extract other concessions with public policy implications, with
any price increase financed by taxpayers. A number of cities
across the country have adopted various procurement laws that
require municipalities to only purchase from firms with particu-
lar characteristics. 39 These laws include general "responsible
bidder" laws requiring awardees of public contracts to comply
with anticorruption regulations, as well as (in some cases) labor,
environmental, and antidiscrimination standards. 40 Other cities
have more explicit procurement conditions, for example, "that
localities purchase goods with a certain percentage of recycled
content, that they purchase nonpolluting vehicles, or that they
enter into contracts only with companies that provide equal ben-
efits to employees with spouses and employees with domestic
ford 2006).
36 David Fairris, et al, Examining the Evidence: The Impact of the Los Angeles Living
Wage Ordinance on Workers and Businesses 18-21 (2005), available at <http://www.
irle.ucla.edu/publications/index.html> (last visited July 18, 2009).
17 Id at 2-4.
38 See LA Admin Code §§ 10.37.1(d), (j).
39 Adrian Barnes, Do They Have to Buy from Burma?: A Preemption Analysis of Local
Antisweatshop Procurement Laws, 107 Colum L Rev 426, 426-27 (2007).
40 Id at 428-29.
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partners."41 Antisweatshop or "sweat-free" ordinances have de-
veloped as a specific version of procurement conditions targeted
at eliminating labor violations in domestic (and sometimes for-
eign) firms that sell apparel and textile goods to city agencies. 42
Following the lead of New York City, which first passed an anti-
sweatshop ordinance in 2002, a small number of cities have
passed similar procurement laws; some dioceses, school districts,
and individual high schools have also developed similar poli-
cies.43
Los Angeles enacted its Sweat-Free Procurement Ordinance
in 2004, after a decade-long struggle to improve conditions in the
nation's largest garment industry.44 Labor abuse was endemic in
the garment sector. In 1994, the federal government reported
that there were 4,500 sweatshops in Los Angeles, 45 while a state
study found that half of California's garment shops were in viola-
tion of minimum wage laws and two-thirds broke overtime
laws. 46 A 1998 Department of Labor survey repeated similar con-
clusions, finding that nearly two-thirds of garment firms in Los
Angeles were violating wage and hour regulations, underpaying
workers by over $70 million per year.47
The antisweatshop movement was built upon a foundation of
labor activism in the garment industry that began to gain
strength in the early 1990s. It was galvanized by the 1995 dis-
covery of enslaved Thai workers in a garment contract shop out-
side of Los Angeles that produced goods for well-known manufac-
turers and retailers, including Mervyn's. 48 That case, which was
41 Id at 429.
42 Id at 432. To the extent that such ordinances apply to foreign contractors, there is
some uncertainty about whether they are preempted by federal trade law. Barnes, 107
Colum L Rev at 437-39 (cited in note 39).
43 SweatFree Communities, Adopted Policies, available at <http://www.sweatfree.org/
policieslist> (last visited July 18, 2009). To date, only the New York ordinance has been
challenged. In that case, the court invalidated the ordinance on the ground that it vi-
olated state referendum law and was preempted by a preexisting state finance law re-
lated to apparel contracting. Mayor of City of New York v Council of City of New York, 789
NYS2d 860, 865 (NY County Supreme Ct 2004).
44 Scott L. Cummings, Hemmed In: Legal Mobilization in the Los Angeles Anti-
Sweatshop Movement, 30 Berkeley J Empl & Lab L (forthcoming 2009) (on file with the U
Chi Legal F).
45 US General Accounting Office, Report No GAO/HEHS-95-29, Garment Industry:
Efforts to Address the Prevalence and Conditions of Sweatshops 5 (1994).
46 Stuart Silverstein, Survey of Garment Industry Finds Rampant Labor Abuse, LA
Times Dl (Apr 15, 1994).
47 Edna Bonacich and Richard P. Appelbaum, Behind the Label: Inequality in the Los
Angeles Apparel Industry 3 (California 2000).
48 Cummings, Hemmed In at *19 (cited in note 44).
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litigated by lawyers at the Asian Pacific American Legal Center
("APALC"), produced a highly publicized settlement of over $3.5
million and helped to spur the development of an infrastructure
of antisweatshop organizations that included Sweatshop Watch,
formed to coordinate policy research and advocacy, and the Gar-
ment Worker Center ("GWC"), created to assist workers in reco-
vering unpaid wages and promoting collective action to reform
the garment industry.49 A coalition of antisweatshop groups, led
by APALC, Sweatshop Watch, the Union of Needletrades, Indus-
trial and Textile Employees ("UNITE"), and other immigrant
rights and labor groups, won passage of a statewide law in 2000
that assigned liability for labor abuse to garment manufacturers
that contracted with sweatshop firms.50 On the heels of this vic-
tory, the coalition expanded to include the newly formed GWC,
the international antisweatshop group Global Exchange, and the
Progressive Jewish Alliance (among others) in an effort to leve-
rage the power of city contracting to improve conditions among
the garment firms that sold items directly to the city.51
The Sweat-Free Procurement Ordinance campaign was or-
ganized on the heels of a hard-fought legal case filed by APALC
against the young women's retailer, Forever 21, which APALC
sued on behalf of several Latina workers claiming unpaid wag-
es.52 The case was coordinated with an organizing effort con-
ducted by the GWC that received a great deal of media attention
and precipitated a counter-attack by Forever 21 that included
suits against labor activists and workers protesting in front of
Forever 21 retail stores. 53 The case ultimately settled in 2004 for
an undisclosed amount. The antisweatshop coalition moved to
capitalize on the political momentum generated by the case by
49 Id at *63-*67.
50 Cal Labor Code § 2673.1(a) (West 2003) (stating that garment manufacturers
"shall guarantee payment of the applicable minimum wage and overtime compensation"
due to employees of their contractors).
51 For a list of groups that lobbied for the Sweat-Free Procurement Ordinance, see
Global Exchange, Los Angeles Council Passes Anti-Sweatshop Ordinance, (Nov 9, 2004),
available at <http://www.globalexchange.org/campaigns/sweatshops/2675.html> (last
visited July 18, 2009).
52 Victor Narro, Finding the Synergy Between Law and Organizing: Experiences from
the Streets of Los Angeles, 35 Fordham Urban L J 339, 349-50 (2008).
53 These suits were ultimately struck down under the state Strategic Litigation
Against Public Participation ("SLAPP") statute, which allows a court to dismiss a cause of
action "arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the person's right of petition
or free speech." Cal Civ Proc Code § 425.16(b)(1) (West 2009). For a discussion of the
SLAPP suit litigation, see Cummings, Hemmed In at *53-54 (cited in note 44).
187]
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM
reaching out to allies on the Los Angeles City Council to support
an antisweatshop ordinance. 54
In 2004, the city council unanimously enacted the Sweat-
Free Procurement Ordinance. In describing the need for pro-
curement standards, the ordinance stated:
In its role as a market participant that procures equip-
ment, goods, materials, and supplies, the City seeks to
protect its interests by assuring that the integrity of the
City's procurement process is not undermined by contrac-
tors who engage in sweatshop practices and other em-
ployment practices abhorrent to the City.55
Toward that end, the ordinance requires all city contractors
to sign a "Contractor Code of Conduct" in which they agree to
comply with all applicable employment, labor, and environmen-
tal laws, and all "human and labor rights and labor obligations
that are imposed by treaty or law on the country in which the
equipment, supplies, goods or materials are made or assem-
bled.15 6 The Code of Conduct also requires contractors to "take
good faith measures" to ensure that subcontractors comply with
its terms. 57 The ordinance covers all city contracts for "equip-
ment, goods, materials or supplies."58 For "contracts involving
the procurement of garments, uniforms, foot apparel, and related
accessories," contractors are bound to ensure that workers are
paid a "procurement living wage" equal to the federal poverty
threshold for a family of three plus an additional 20 percent, paid
as hourly wages or health benefits. 59
A key issue with any Code of Conduct is monitoring and en-
forcement. The ordinance places the ultimate authority with the
city's Department of General Services to evaluate allegations of
violations and to impose sanctions, which may range from a de-
mand that contractors provide access to monitors to the termina-
tion of contracts for breach. Under the terms of the ordinance, in
evaluating contractor compliance, the city shall "take into con-
sideration relevant and reliable information including, but not
limited to, information provided by the contractor and its subcon-
54 Narro, 35 Fordham Urban L J at 357 (cited in note 52).
55 LA Admin Code § 10.43.
56 Id at § 10.43.3.A and B.
57 Id at § 10.43.3.C.
58 Id at § 10.43.1.B.
59 LA Admin Code § 10.43.3.D.
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tractors at the point of manufacture, assembly or service, reports
from reputable national and international organizations, docu-
mented media reports, and credible information from local
groups and organizations."60 Since labor violations may occur at
the subcontractor level, gaining access to subcontractor practices
and providing credible evidence of violations is crucial to the or-
dinance's enforcement. In order to enhance enforcement, anti-
sweatshop groups in Los Angeles fought for a strong outside
monitoring agency and ultimately succeeded in persuading the
Department of General Services to retain the Worker Rights
Consortium, a labor rights organization that grew out of United
Students Against Sweatshops and focuses on monitoring condi-
tions in factories that produce university logo apparel. 61 In 2007,
in its first official investigation under the agreement, the Worker
Rights Consortium evaluated a Cambodian producer of Dickies
brand clothing sold to Los Angeles. As a result of the investiga-
tion, the company agreed to reinstate a worker harassed and
fired for union organizing, adopt an antidiscrimination policy
related to pregnant workers, and reverse its practice of denying
bathroom breaks and sick leave.6 2
3. Concession agreements: The Clean Trucks Program.
In addition to contracting out for goods and services, local
governments may also enter into concession agreements with
private companies granting them the right to undertake econom-
ic activity within the locality for a period of time.63 A concession
agreement is akin to a lease, but distinct in that concessionaires
do not take a proprietary interest in real property, but rather are
given the privilege of operating in connection with governmental
property under contractual terms that specify the scope of go-
vernmental permission. A concession agreement allows a private
company to provide goods or services on public property that
might otherwise be provided directly by government personnel.
Airport vendors, for example, operate under concession agree-
ments that allow them to sell food to travelers on publicly owned
60 Id at § 10.43.5.
61 Sweat-Free Update: Independent Monitor Hired to Enforce Los Angeles' SweatFree
Law, 13 Sweatshop Watch 1, 6 (Spring 2007).
62 SweatFree Communities, Independent Factory Investigation Improves Conditions
in Los Angeles Supplier Factory, available at <http://www.sweatfree.org/statements-
newwide308> (last visited July 19, 2009).
63 Nicholas Miranda, Note, Concession Agreements: From Private Contract to Public
Policy, 117 Yale L J 510, 512 (2007).
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property. As seen in the fight over worker retention at the Los
Angeles International Airport ("LAX") discussed above, conces-
sion agreements may be used to privatize otherwise public ser-
vices in ways that undercut unionization.
A recent campaign to institute a "Clean Trucks Program" at
the port of Los Angeles, however, shows that concession agree-
ments may be used as a tool to promote unionization-while also
linking labor and environmental goals. The port of Los Angeles
sits side-by-side with the port of Long Beach on San Pedro Bay,
which straddles the Los Angeles-Long Beach border. The port of
Los Angeles, which ranks first in the country in terms of con-
tainer volume (and, along with the port of Long Beach, handles
over 40 percent of the country's total imported goods),64 is a pub-
lic agency that owns and manages the port property as a trustee
and is governed by the Los Angeles Harbor Commission, which is
a five-member board appointed by the Los Angeles mayor and
confirmed by city council.
A port authority will typically contract with a company
called a terminal operator to run the port and coordinate the in-
terface between the ships that carry cargo by sea and the trucks,
to and from which the cargo is transferred. The terminal opera-
tor will, in turn, enter into contracts with shipping and trucking
companies, under which they pay tariffs for the privilege of ac-
cessing the port facilities. At the Port of Los Angeles, the struc-
ture of these arrangements had been loosely regulated, with one
result being that trucking companies with port contracts began
in the 1980s to hire drivers as independent contractors, rather
than employees, which allowed them to reduce costs by lowering
payments and eliminating employment-related expenses (such as
health care), while also avoiding unionization. 65 This structure
led to reduced driver income and placed pressure on the drivers,
as independent contractors, to cut costs associated with truck
operation. 66 Drivers therefore lacked strong financial incentives
to invest in maintenance or upgrade from old trucks that pro-
duced high levels of harmful diesel emissions. Old trucks have
contributed significantly to high levels of air pollution at the Los
64 Louis Sahagun and Ronald D. White, Truckers and Ports Head to Court, LA Times
B3 (Sept 8, 2008).
65 Los Angeles Alliance for a New Economy, The Road to Shared Prosperity: The
Regional Economic Benefits of the San Pedro Bay Ports' Clean Trucks Program 11 (Aug
2007), available at <http://www.laane.org/> (last visited July 19, 2009).
66 Id at 12.
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Angeles-Long Beach ports complex, which accounts for one-
fourth of the air pollution in Los Angeles.67
In 2007, to address both the labor and environmental issues
related to the Port of Los Angeles, LAANE-working as part of
the Coalition for Clean and Safe Ports68 -undertook its Clean
Trucks Program campaign, which culminated in the passage of a
city ordinance formally authorizing the program on June 26,
2008.69 The stated goals of the program were to:
(a) further the improvement of air quality at the Port, (b)
create an efficient, reliable supply of drayage [shipping]
services to the Port for the sustainable future, (c) estab-
lish performance criteria for providers of drayage services
that promote the Port's business objectives, (d) ensure suf-
ficient supply of drayage drivers, by improvement of wag-
es, benefits, and working conditions, (e) enhance Port se-
curity and safety, and (f) reduce negative impacts on the
local community. 70
In order to advance these goals, the ordinance approved an
order of the Los Angeles Harbor Commission amending the port's
operating rules (called "Tariff No. 4") to require that trucking
companies providing drayage services enter into a "Drayage
Truck Concession Agreement" with the port in order to gain port
access. 71 These agreements were designed to significantly alter
the structure of the trucking industry's relationship with the
port by requiring that a trucking company: (1) transition its
drivers from independent contractors to 100 percent employees
by December 31, 2013; (2) take steps to meet local hiring goals;
and (3) retrofit or replace all trucks to meet specific environmen-
tal standards.72 In addition, the Clean Trucks Program aimed to
67 Id at 23. Evelyn Larrubia, Labor, Environmentalists Unusual Allies; Ports' Clean
Trucks Program Has Union Leaders Talking "Green," but Some Truckers Want to Put on
the Breaks, LA Times B3 (Nov 27, 2008).
68 This coalition includes the American Lung Association of California, Change to
Win, CLUE, CHIRLA, Communities for a Better Environment, the Los Angeles County
Federation of Labor, LAANE, Natural Resources Defense Council, Sierra Club, and
Teamsters, among others. See Coalition for Clean & Safe Ports, available at
<http://www.cleanandsafeports.orglindex.php?id=8> (last visited July 19, 2009).
69 LA Ordinance No 179981 (June 26, 2008).
70 Id at 23.
71 Idat 24.
72 Drayage Services Concession Agreement for Access to the Port of Los Angeles 2-4,
available at <http://www.cleanairactionplan.org/civica/filebank/blobdload.asp?BlobID =
2350> (last visited Sept 8, 2009).
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ban pre-1989 trucks and progressively require all trucks to meet
2007 emission standards, while also imposing a container fee to
help finance the nearly $2 billion in fleet modernization costs
necessary to replace or upgrade approximately 17,000 old diesel
trucks.73 By eliminating dirty trucks, the program sought to sig-
nificantly reduce the emission of diesel particulates, and by
mandating that concessionaires hire drivers as employees, the
program sought to make it possible for the drivers to be
unionized. The program thus attempted to achieve a crucial ob-
jective of organized labor-facilitating unionization-while also
forging an alliance with environmental groups around an issue of
common concern.
74
However, the Clean Trucks Program, designed to go into ef-
fect on October 1, 2008, has been held up by legal challenges,
which as they currently stand leave the program's central fea-
tures in doubt. In July 2008, the American Trucking Association
brought suit challenging the concession agreements as
preempted by federal law. Although the district court initially
denied the Association's motion for a preliminary injunction, that
ruling was reversed by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which
held that crucial aspects of the program-including the indepen-
dent contractor phase-out provision-were likely to be preempted
by the Federal Aviation Administrative Authorization Act go-
verning the "price, route, or service" of motor carriers engaged in
interstate commerce, 75 and were unlikely to fall within the Act's
73 Rick Wartzman, Airing a Pollution Solution for the Ports, LA Times C1 (Feb 23,
2007); Sahagun and White, Truckers and Ports Head to Court, LA Times B3 (cited in note
64).
74 In another example of an effort to link labor and environmental goals that leverag-
es city contracting authority, the Los Angeles City Council in 2009 passed the Green Jobs
Ordinance, which requires that the city develop a plan for the use of state and federal
funds to retrofit city buildings to green standards that gives priority to retrofitting
projects "in areas with high levels of poverty and unemployment," while requiring "[t]o
the extent feasible and permissible by applicable law" that "the work performed under
Construction Contracts associated with the Program be performed by Local Residents."
LA Admin Code § 7.302(D)-(E). "Local Resident" is defined as "an individual whose pri-
mary place of residence at the commencement of a project under the Program on which
that individual is seeking employment is within the City and is within the zip code con-
taining at least part of one census tract with a rate of unemployment in excess of 150% of
the Los Angeles County unemployment rate." Id at § 7.301(H). The Green Jobs Ordinance
was developed by the Los Angeles Apollo Alliance, a coalition of labor and environmental
groups spearheaded by AGENDA and its research/policy arm, Strategic Concepts in Or-
ganizing & Policy Education. See Los Angeles Apollo Alliance, Los Angeles Adopts Land-
mark Green Jobs Ordinance (Apr 7, 2009), available at <http://apolloalliance.org/wp-
content/uploads/2009/04/04-07-09-la-ordinance-press-release-final.pdf> (last visited July
19, 2009).
75 49 USC § 14501(c)(1) (2006).
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statutory "safety exception." 76 Upon remand, the district court, in
an opinion issued in April 2009, enjoined the central provisions
of the program, including the independent contractor phase-out,
the local hiring preference, and the truck modernization re-
quirement. 77 Although the decision has been appealed, it appears
at this stage that the city's ambitious plan to leverage its conces-
sion authority to promote the unionization of the port's trucking
industry is in legal jeopardy. Nonetheless, by focusing attention
on concession agreements, it suggests yet another possible way
that local governments might use their contracting power to
shape labor conditions.
B. The Land Use Model
Land use authority remains at the heart of local power. This
power can be vast since virtually every business requires some
sort of land use permit to operate. Land use authority derives
from the local police power, 78 and has been viewed as a way to
prevent one property owner's activities from spilling over onto an
adjacent owner's land.79 But since the 1920s, local governments
have expanded their land use powers, using it as a tool of local
fiscal policy to promote uses that contribute to municipal budgets
and zone out those that detract from them.80 Indeed, the ubiquity
of land use has led groups from across the political spectrum to
use it to foster their policy goals, even if those goals have little in
common with traditional spillover problems. For instance, the
"New Urbanist" movement seeks to change land use policies to
reduce automobile dependence, develop accessible and inclusive
public spaces, promote economic diversity, and augment open
space.8' Following this trend towards more expansive land use
76 American Trucking Associations, Inc v City of Los Angeles, 559 F3d 1046, 1057,
1060-61 (9th Cir 2009).
77 American Trucking Associations, Inc v City of Los Angeles, 2009 WL 1160212, *20-
*21 (C D Cal). In another legal challenge, a federal court denied a preliminary injunction
sought by the Federal Maritime Commission alleging that the program would drive small
firms and independent drivers out of the market. Carol J. Williams, Court Refuses to Halt
Clean-Truck Program, LA Times A10 (Apr 16, 2009). The Commission subsequently
dropped the lawsuit.
78 Daniel J. Curtin, Jr. and Cecily T. Talbert, California Land Use and Planning Law
1 (Solano 27th ed 2007).
79 Village of Euclid v Ambler Realty, 272 US 365, 388 (1927).
80 William A. Fischel, Property Taxation and the Tiebout Model: Evidence for the
Benefit View from Zoning and Voting, 30 J Econ Lit 171, 171 (1992).
81 Congress for the New Urbanism, Charter of the New Urbanism, available at
<http://www.cnu.org/sites/fileslcharter-english.pdf> (last visited July 19, 2009) (showing
how broadly the movement views the purposes of land use authority).
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planning, cities have also begun to use land use authority to af-
fect local labor markets and inject low-wage workers' concerns
into economic development policy.
1. Redevelopment.
A key function of local land use planning is promoting the
development of vacant property and the redevelopment of prop-
erty deemed underutilized. The formal process of "redevelop-
ment" involves designating "blighted" areas as redevelopment
zones where the city has power to take property by eminent do-
main for private development and capture increased property tax
revenues from redeveloped sites ("tax increment").8 2 In Califor-
nia, state law allows municipalities to exercise redevelopment
powers through a community redevelopment agency ("CRA"). 83
Los Angeles, for example, delegates these powers to a board of
commissioners appointed by the mayor and confirmed by the city
council. In addition to this set of powers associated with "redeve-
lopment" officially defined, cities also have the power to foster
development outside of the formal redevelopment law, particu-
larly through the provision of public subsidies to entice develop-
ers. The concept of redevelopment has a checkered past and re-
mains much maligned. Its inception in the 1950s as a federally
sponsored program called Urban Renewal-in which the federal
government gave cities grants and loans to effectuate redevelop-
ment plans-quickly became associated with "slum clearance" in
order to promote business-oriented "downtown development,"
leading to the demolition of low-income neighborhoods that crit-
ics labeled "Negro Removal."8 4 Urban Renewal was eventually
terminated as a federal policy but revived as a local government
authority chartered under state law.85
Affordable housing has been a central focus of redevelop-
ment, which often displaces local low-income residents by razing
their dwellings to make way for new residential and commercial
properties. California redevelopment law, for instance, requires
that 20 percent of the tax increment generated by a project area
82 William B. Fulton, Guide to California Planning 243-79 (Solano 1999).
83 Cal Health & Safety Code § 33100.
84 Martin Anderson, The Federal Bulldozer: A Critical Analysis of Urban Renewal,
1949-1962 1-14 (MIT 1964); Robert Halpern, Rebuilding the Inner City: A History of
Neighborhood Initiatives to Address Poverty in the United States 64-71 (Columbia 1995).
85 Benjamin B. Quinones, Redevelopment Redefined: Revitalizing the Central City
with Resident Control, 27 Mich J L Reform 689, 700-07 (1994).
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be used to increase affordable housing. In addition, the law man-
dates that new and substantially rehabilitated residential devel-
opments include designated percentages of affordable units.8 6
a) Community benefits agreements. The use of redeve-
lopment to influence hiring and work standards, however, is not
inscribed in redevelopment law and has traditionally not been
viewed as an explicit redevelopment goal. Yet a number of me-
chanisms have evolved to tie redevelopment to workplace issues.
For example, the approval of redevelopment projects has been
linked to project labor agreements that institute pre-hire collec-
tive bargaining agreements between developers and the unions
representing workers involved on the project, particularly in the
construction trades.8 7 Recently, the development process has
been viewed as a way not simply to leverage unionized jobs dur-
ing the construction phase, but also to promote living wage jobs
responsive to local resident hiring needs once projects are built
and leased out to commercial tenants.88 These efforts have gen-
erally involved project-specific policies, some included in devel-
opment agreements between developers and the city, and others
negotiated between developers and community coalitions.
As a historical matter, community benefits promised by pri-
vate developers have generally been negotiated between the de-
velopers and public agencies.8 9 These benefits have been incorpo-
rated in the development agreement, which a city typically re-
quires either when it sells land to private developers below cost
or provides other types of public subsidies. 90 Although communi-
ty groups do not have a formal role in negotiating the contents of
a development agreement, they have worked with city officials in
certain instances to win contractually defined community bene-
fits. In Los Angeles, LAANE worked closely with Councilwoman
86 Cal Health & Safety Code §§ 33334.2(a), 33413(b)(1)-(2).
87 See, for example, Patricia E. Salkin and Amy Lavine, Understanding Community
Benefits Agreements: Equitable Development, Social Justice and Other Considerations for
Developers, Municipalities and Community Organizations, 26 UCLA J Envir L & Pol 291,
308 (2008).
88 Scott L. Cummings, Mobilization Lawyering: Community Economic Development in
the Figueroa Corridor, in Sarat and Scheingold, eds, Cause Lawyers and Social Move-
ments 302, 313-24 (cited in note 35).
89 William Ho, Community Benefits Agreements: An Evolution in Public Benefits
Negotiation Processes, 17 J Affordable Housing & Community Dev L 7, 9 (Fall 2007/
Winter 2008).
90 Julian Gross, Greg LeRoy, and Madeline Janis-Aparicio, Community Benefits
Agreements: Making Development Projects Accountable, 9 (Good Jobs First and the Cali-
fornia Partnership for Working Families 2005).
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Jackie Goldberg to incorporate a community benefits package-
which included provisions for living wage jobs, card check neu-
trality, local hiring, and job training-into the 1998 development
agreement for a large entertainment and retail project in Holly-
wood. 91 The inclusion of community benefits provisions in the
development agreement allows a city to enforce such provisions
against the developer. However, it does not provide a mechanism
for direct enforcement by community organizations, which may
be important since government enforcement incentives dissipate
after subsidies are awarded and projects are built.
The community benefits agreement ("CBA") responds to this
enforcement gap by creating a contractual relationship between
community organizations and the developer, in which the devel-
oper agrees to provide designated benefits in exchange for com-
munity support for the project. CBAs emerged in Los Angeles in
2000 as a way to give greater scope for community input in rede-
velopment decision making.9 2 The first CBA was negotiated by
the Figueroa Corridor Coalition for Economic Justice, led by
Strategic Actions for a Just Economy ("SAJE"), along with
groups active in the living wage and antisweatshop movements:
LAANE, ACORN, AGENDA, Esperanza Community Housing
Corporation, the Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rights of Los
Angeles ("CHIRLA"), HERE Local 11, and SEIU Local 1877. The
coalition used the threat of holding up the project by contesting
environmental and land use approval to negotiate a CBA with
the owners of the Staples Center, in connection with L.A. Live, a
proposed $1 billion sports and entertainment complex adjacent to
the Staples Center with high-end hotels, apartments, offices, res-
taurants, nightclubs, and a live theater. Under the CBA, the coa-
lition agreed both to release its right to oppose the development
project (which included bringing lawsuits, taking administrative
actions, and expressing public opposition) and to provide affirma-
tive support for the project (which included issuing a press re-
lease and testifying in support of administrative approvals). In
exchange for the coalition's cooperation, the developer agreed to
a substantial community benefits program, which included $1
million for a park, $25 thousand per year for five years to create
a residential parking permit program, a first source hiring pro-
91 Erskine and Marblestone, The Movement Takes the Lead at 250-51 (cited in note
35); Los Angeles Alliance for a New Economy, A Track Record of Success, available at
<http://www.laane.org/> (last visited July 19, 2009) (found by going to Victories under the
About Us tab).
92 Cummings, Mobilization Lawyering at 302 (cited in note 88).
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gram in which employers would make efforts to hire local resi-
dents, and an agreement to produce affordable housing units
equivalent to 20 percent of the total units constructed. 93 In an
attempt to fill a gap of the Los Angeles Living Wage Ordinance,
which does not apply to the tenants of publicly subsidized devel-
opers, the CBA required that the developer "shall make all rea-
sonable efforts to maximize the number of living wage jobs" in
the project and agree to a 70 percent living wage goal for the an-
ticipated 5,500 jobs.94
The Figueroa Corridor Coalition's success in negotiating the
CBA led to an explosion of CBAs around the country. 95 In Los
Angeles, there were two major CBAs that followed. The first was
between Los Angeles World Airports, the city department that
owns and operates LAX, and a coalition of school districts,
churches, environmental organizations, and labor groups that
earmarked nearly $500 million for soundproofing schools, homes,
and businesses, setting up job training programs, and conducting
environmental studies in connection with the $11 billion moder-
nization of LAX.96 The second was negotiated around the pro-
posed $2 billion Grand Avenue mega-development project to
build four-hundred thousand square feet of retail space, a high-
end hotel, housing, and a park near the Disney Hall Music Cen-
ter in the northern part of downtown Los Angeles. That CBA in-
cluded provisions that echo the Staples Center CBA terms, in-
cluding a 20 percent inclusionary affordable housing provision,
$50 million for the development of a public park, local hiring and
job training requirements, and an agreement to require all per-
manent jobs to pay the living wage rate.97
There was an effort to convert the success of the CBA strate-
gy into local policy reforms. In Los Angeles, community groups
such as LAANE pushed the CRA to adopt a community impact
report policy, which would have required developers within rede-
93 Id at 322.
94 Id.
95 See Patricia E. Salkin and Amy Lavine, Negotiating for Social Justice and the
Promise of Community Benefits Agreements: Case Studies of Current and Developing
Agreements, 17 J Affordable Housing & Community Dev L 113 (Fall 2007IWinter 2008)
(providing case studies of CBA campaigns).
96 For a general discussion, see Los Angeles World Airports, LAX Master Plan, Com-
munity Benefits Agreement (CBA) 2007 Annual Progress Report, available at <http://www.
laxmasterplan.org/commBenefitspdf/CBAStatusReport2007.pdf> (last visited July 19,
2009).
97 Grand Avenue Committee, Community Benefits (Jan 22, 2007), available at
<http://www.grandavenuecommittee.orglcommunity.html> (last visited July 19, 2009).
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velopment project areas to take into account the impact of
projects on affordable housing and jobs along the lines of the cur-
rent environmental review system. But that proposal was tabled
after strong developer opposition. 98 The CRA did, however, insti-
tute a series of policies attempting to link the disbursement of
redevelopment funds more closely to labor issues. First, it passed
living wage and worker retention policies in 2003 that bring the
CRA in line with the Los Angeles city ordinances on these issues.
Specifically, the CRA Living Wage Policy extends the living wage
requirements of the Los Angeles Living Wage Ordinance to CRA
contractors, lessees/licensees, and financial assistance reci-
pients. 99
b) Construction Careers and Project Stabilization Policy.
In 2008, the CRA instituted a new policy aimed at promoting the
hiring of local low-income residents on CRA-financed projects,
called the Construction Careers and Project Stabilization Poli-
cy.100 The policy-advanced by LAANE and the Los Angeles
County Federation of Labor-applies, with limited exceptions, to
projects receiving over $500 thousand in public improvement
funds (to build, for example, sidewalks, parks, or parking lots),
projects constructed on CRA-owned property, or more than $1
million in CRA subsidies.10 1 The policy requires that these cov-
ered projects comply with local hiring requirements mandating
that "Community Area and Local Residents" perform a minimum
of 30 percent of all work on the projects and that "Disadvantaged
Workers" with minimal union experience perform 10 percent of
all project work. 10 2 The policy also requires new CRA projects to
98 Cummings, Mobilization Lawyering at 324 (cited in note 88). The City of Petaluma
in Sonoma County recently approved "the first Community Impact Report (CIR) require-
ment for new commercial development of more than 25,000 square feet, including retail
establishments, grocery stores and hotels." Martin J. Bennett, Petaluma Leads Again
with New Impact Reports, Press Democrat (Jan 12, 2009).
99 Living Wage Policy, Community Redevelopment Agency of the City of Los Angeles
(adopted May 29, 2003), available at <http://www.crala.org/internet-site[Policies/index.
cfm> (last visited Apr 16, 2009).
100 Ronald D. White, Seeking to Help At-Risk Workers, LA Times C1 (Sept 1, 2008).
101 Construction Careers and Project Stabilization Policy § 11(1) (The Community
Redevelopment Agency of the City of Los Angeles, Cal, 2008), available at <http://www.
crala.org/internet-site/Policies/Local-Hire-Policy-Programs.cfm> (last visited Apr 16,
2009).
102 Id at § III(1). A "Community Area Resident" is defined as "an individual whose
primary place of residence is in the City of Los Angeles and is within the CRA/LA deter-
mined project impact area, typically bounded by a 3-mile radius of the Project Area in
which the Covered Project is located." Id at § I(8). A "Local Resident" is defined as some-
one "whose primary place of residence is within the City and is within the zip code con-
[2009:208
MOBILIZING LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW
be covered by project labor agreements and requires developers
to engage a Jobs Coordinator to reach out to targeted local and
low-income residents, coordinate job training programs, and faci-
litate hiring. 10 3 Before the current recession, the policy was fore-
cast to create five thousand jobs for local residents over the next
five years. 104
2. Conditional use.
Conditional use permitting is a process under which a prop-
erty owner may obtain permission for a land use not otherwise
allowed as a matter of right by zoning law. It thus allows a prop-
erty owner the opportunity to argue for "relief from the strict
terms of a comprehensive zoning ordinance.' 1 5 For example,
some cities may not automatically allow the development of a
school in an area zoned for residential use, but may allow a
school to be built if the developer obtains a conditional use per-
mit ("CUP") that demonstrates how the proposed school would be
compatible with the existing residential nature of the communi-
ty. In California, the criteria for issuing a CUP is determined by
local ordinance. 06 Traditionally, the CUP process has been used
to regulate noxious or incompatible land uses in order to pre-
serve the character of a community. It has not been a tool for ad-
dressing redistributive issues related to workplace policy. Re-
cently, however, the CUP process has been adapted in a number
of cases to address low-wage work. While these adaptations pro-
mote the goal of improving labor conditions, they resonate with
more traditional land use objectives: redressing blight, abating
nuisances, and counteracting redlining.
a) Blight: The Los Angeles Superstores Ordinance. The
CUP process has been invoked in connection with development
taining at least part of one census tract with a rate of unemployment rate in excess of
150% of the Los Angeles County unemployment rate." Id at § 1(29). A "Disadvantaged
Worker" is someone "whose primary place of residence is within the City and who, prior
to commencing work on a Covered Project, either (a) has a household income of less than
50% of the AMI or (b) faces at least one of the following barriers to employment: being
homeless; being a custodial single parent; receiving public assistance; lacking a GED or
high school diploma; having a criminal record or other involvement with the criminal
justice system; or suffering from chronic unemployment." Construction Careers and
Project Stabilization Policy at § 1(18) (cited in note 101).
103 Id at §§ IV, V(5).
104 White, Seeking to Help At-Risk Workers, LA Times at Cl (cited in note 100).
105 Curtin and Talbert, Curtin's California Land Use and Planning Law at 61 (cited in
note 78).
106 Id at 63.
187] 209
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM
decisions having multiple "community impacts," some of which
are akin to traditional land use concerns (such as the effect on
local businesses and housing), while some are related to labor
standards (such as the impact on wages and other job related
benefits). Because the concerns motivating the use of CUPs in
these contexts extend beyond "physical blight," the traditional
controls associated with environmental review are considered
insufficient. 10 7 Extending the CUP to regulate issues more direct-
ly concerned with conditions of employment may also impact la-
bor organizing, albeit indirectly.
Although other cities had passed bans on big-box develop-
ment, Los Angeles was the first city to pass a "Superstores Or-
dinance" requiring an economic impact analysis.108 The ordin-
ance was the culmination of a two-year-long organizing drive led
by LAANE and United Food and Commercial Workers Union
("UFCW") Local 770 to stop the development of what would have
been the first Wal-Mart Supercenter in metropolitan Los An-
geles, to be located in the City of Inglewood. 10 9 This "site fight"-
which again included groups that had been involved in prior
campaigns around the living wage and CBAs (like CLUE and
ACORN)--combined litigation and grassroots organizing to mo-
bilize voters in Inglewood to defeat a Wal-Mart-sponsored ballot
initiative that would have authorized the development without
the normal environmental and land use review process. The suc-
cessful defeat of the proposed Inglewood Supercenter revived
stalled efforts to pass an ordinance regulating big-box develop-
ment in Los Angeles. From a legal standpoint, there was concern
about the validity of any type of outright ban, which could be
viewed by a court as an impermissible use of zoning law to inter-
fere with private business for economic reasons (like protecting
labor standards in the grocery industry) unrelated to typical land
use concerns (such as preventing blight or reducing traffic). 110
107 In one California case, however, environmental review has been extended to cover
"economic blight" related to big-box retail development. Bakersfield Citizens for Local
Control v City of Bakersfield, 124 Cal App 4th 1184, 1193 (2004).
108 Jessica Garrison, L.A. Council Votes to Restrict Superstores, LA Times Al (Aug 11,
2004); Jessica Garrison, Los Angeles City Panels Back Plan to Hinder Wal-Mart Stores,
LA Times B3 (Aug 5, 2004). See also Rene Sanchez, L.A. City Council Considers Putting
Lid on Big-Box Retailers, Wash Post (Aug 15, 2004); Jessica Garrison, Battles Over Mega-
Stores May Shift to New Studies; Law Requiring Economic Impact Reports Could Set the
Stage for Skirmishes Across Los Angeles, LA Times B1 (Aug 12, 2004); Daniel B. Wood, A
New Twist in the Wal-Mart Wars, Christian Sci Monitor USA 2 (Aug 12, 2004).
109 Cummings, 95 Cal L Rev at 1929-31 (cited in note 9).
110 See George Lefcoe, The Regulation of Superstores: The Legality of Zoning Ordin-
ances Emerging from the Skirmishes Between Wal-Mart and the United Food and Com-
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Moreover, even if the ban were based on legitimate land use
grounds, there remained the very real possibility that Wal-Mart
would nonetheless sue, tying up any proposed ordinance in costly
litigation, or challenge the ordinance through a referendum.
LAANE decided to oppose a ban, which it argued invited risky
litigation and ballot fights.111 As an alternative, LAANE began to
advocate for an ordinance requiring Wal-Mart to submit an eco-
nomic impact analysis demonstrating the absence of adverse
economic impacts prior to a Supercenter's approval. 112 This idea
was roughly modeled on the process for environmental review
that had proved to be a potent vehicle for pressing community
demands and echoed the community impact report that LAANE
had unsuccessfully lobbied for in front of the CRA. 113 The impact
report idea was thus resurrected in connection with discussions
about big-box regulation,1 1 4 and after the Inglewood fight came to
represent a way out of the political and legal impasse created by
a big-box ban. Accordingly, the UFCW signed onto the idea of
pursuing an economic impact analysis, and the city passed the
Superstores Ordinance in August 2004.115
The ordinance defines "Superstore" as "a Major Development
Project that sells from the premises goods and merchandise,
primarily for personal or household use, and whose total Sales
Floor Area exceeds 100,000 square feet and which devote more
than 10% of sales floor area to the sale of Non-Taxable Merchan-
dise."116 The ordinance applies to Superstores slated to be located
in "Economic Assistance Areas,"1 17 which include federal and
state enterprise zones and city redevelopment project areas cov-
ering much of Los Angeles's low-income communities.118 The law
mercial Workers Union, 58 Ark L Rev 833, 859-66 (2006). There were also questions
about whether a big-box ban was subject to environmental review under the California
Environmental Quality Act, Cal Pub Resources Code §§ 21000-21177.
Ill Tracy Gray-Barkan, Southern California's Wal-Mart Wars, 35 Soc Pol 31, 37 (Fall
2004).
112 Id at 38.
113 Cummings, Mobilization Lawyering at 324 (cited in note 88).
114 Gray-Barkan, 35 Soc Pol at 38 (cited in note 111) ("[I]n March [2004], ... state
Senator Richard Alarcon introduced a law (later vetoed by Governor Schwarzenegger)
that required local officials to prepare a 'business impact report' (BIR) prior to the ap-
proval of big box stores over '100,000 square feet of gross buildable area' and 'more than
10,000 square feet of floor space to be used for selling non-taxable merchandize."').
115 Cummings, 95 Cal L Rev at 1972-73 (cited in note 9).
116 LA Municipal Code § 12.24(U)(14)(a) (2004). The "Superstore" designation is meant
to indicate that the ordinance applies to all big-box stores that meet the statutory defini-
tion, not just Wal-Mart Supercenters.
117 Id at § 12.24(U)(14)(d).
18 Id at § 12.24(U)(14)(a).
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makes the development of a Superstore in such an area contin-
gent on the receipt of a CUP.119 In order to receive a CUP, a Su-
perstore developer must submit an economic impact analysis to
the city's Community Development Department (or CRA if the
project is within a redevelopment zone) specifying whether the
store would "have an adverse impact or economic benefit on gro-
cery or retail shopping centers," "result in the physical displace-
ment of any businesses," "require the demolition of housing," de-
stroy park space, displace jobs, impact city revenue, and create
other "materially adverse or positive economic impacts or
blight."120 The analysis must also specify whether there are
measures available to "mitigate any materially adverse economic
impacts."1 21 On the basis of this report and any information sub-
mitted in response, the Community Development Department
must make a recommendation to the City Planning Commission
as to whether the proposed store would result in a "materially
adverse economic impact" and, if so, whether there are any miti-
gation measures available. 122 In order to give final approval to
the project, the City Planning Commission then must conclude
that no irremediable adverse impacts exist-a determination
that is appealable to the full Los Angeles City Council. 123
The ordinance aims to set a high bar for Superstore admis-
sion into Los Angeles by requiring the city to create a public
record, based on empirical evidence, that the economic benefits of
a store will in fact outweigh the costs. In practice, it has generat-
ed a cottage industry of consultants who produce reports on both
sides of the Wal-Mart divide, touting the benefits or condemning
the costs depending on the perspective of the commissioning
group. 24 The ordinance therefore does not eliminate politics from
the siting decision, but rather channels it into an impact analysis
process that places labor activists on a stronger footing than if
they were left solely with the pre-existing land use entitlement
and environmental review standards. In particular, the economic
impact analysis requirement provides a politically legitimate
way for city council members to oppose Wal-Mart because of con-
cerns about its labor practices and negative community effects.
119 See Lefcoe, 58 Ark L Rev at 845 (cited in note 110).
120 LA Municipal Code § 12.24(U)(14)(d)(2)(i)-(ix) (2004).
121 Id at § 12.24(U)(14)(d)(2)(x).
122 Id at § 12.24(U)(14)(d)(3).
123 Id at § 12.24(U)(14)(d)(1).
124 Cummings, 95 Cal L Rev at 1964 (cited in note 9).
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Moreover, the structure of the ordinance, which only compels the
production of information about the economic impact of Supers-
tores, is designed to be less vulnerable to legal attack than a flat
ban on big-box stores. An analogous ordinance was passed in In-
glewood in 2006.125 Since the ordinances were passed, Wal-Mart
has not attempted to develop a Supercenter in Los Angeles or
Inglewood.
b) Nuisance: The Home Improvement Stores Ordinance.
Another adaptation of the CUP process to address low-wage
worker issues grew out of the immigrant rights movement in Los
Angeles. Over the past two decades, increasing immigration and
a lack of employment opportunities have led many immigrants,
mostly men, to seek employment on street corners throughout
Southern California. These workers, known as day laborers, are
subject to high levels of labor abuse, which ranges from an em-
ployer's failure to pay minimum wage to the outright denial of
pay.126 Because day laborers are economically vulnerable and
many are undocumented immigrants, exploitation is common
and often goes unreported. Some city officials have also viewed
the groupings of immigrant laborers, often on street corners or in
front of home improvement stores like Home Depot, as creating
safety and public nuisance issues. In response, local governments
have passed antisolicitation ordinances under their local police
power in an effort to get day laborers off the streets. 27 One of the
earliest examples was in Costa Mesa, California in 1988. Other
cities soon followed suit and drew legal challenges on free speech
grounds from the American Civil Liberties Union and the Mex-
ican Legal Defense and Education Fund, which were largely suc-
cessful in forcing repeal of the laws.1 28
Beginning in 1997, CHIRLA and the Institute of Popular
Education of Southern California (known by its Spanish acronym
as "IDEPSCA") began trying to organize day laborers, educating
them about workplace rights and coordinating formal day labor
125 See Josh Grossberg, Inglewood Law Scrutinizes Superstores: A New Ordinance
Makes It Even More Difficult for Potential Big Boxes to Build by Requiring Them to Pay
for an Economic Impact Analysis, Daily Breeze A3 (July 13, 2006).
126 Abel Valenzuela, Jr., et al, On the Corner: Day Labor in the United States ii, 1-2
(National Day Labor Study, Jan 2006).
127 Michael Torres and Scott Smith, Between the Street and a Hard Place, 30 Pub L J
1, 1 (2007).
128 See Comite de Jornaleros de Glendale v City of Glendale, No CV 04-3521 SJO, slip
op at 26 (C D Cal Jan 15, 2005); Comite de Jornaleros de Redondo Beach v City of Redon-
do Beach, 2006 WL 4081215 (C D Cal Dec 12, 2006).
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hiring sites around the city. 129 This collaborative grew to become
an independent organization, the National Day Labor Organiz-
ing Network ("NDLON"), which was established in 2001.130
NDLON sought to expand day labor organizing in part through
the creation of organized day labor sites, which instituted formal
procedures to govern the hiring process in order to reduce oppor-
tunities for employer abuse. Common arrangements at day labor
sites include a lottery system to equally distribute work and an
agreement among all workers to establish a base wage rate. 131
Beginning in the late 1990s, the City of Los Angeles began di-
rectly paying to operate day labor sites, which were coordinated
by various organizations, including CHIRLA. These centers were
estimated to cost the city between $1.2 and $1.5 million dollars
per year. 132
The idea of enacting a day labor ordinance was conceived as
a way to both counteract city efforts to disperse day laborers and
to create viable, self-financing sites for day labor organizing. It
was linked to the expansion of Home Depot in the Los Angeles
market, which day labor advocates viewed as an opportunity to
shift the financial burden to Home Depot as a condition for
developing a new store. The ordinance campaign was launched
by NDLON in the wake of LAANE's successful effort to pass the
Superstores Ordinance-and sought to build upon the CUP
dimension of the big-box law. The Home Improvement Stores
Ordinance was enacted in 2008 after four years of negotiations
between city council members and immigrant rights advocates. 133
The ordinance amends the CUP provision that covers Su-
perstores to incorporate an additional process for the approval of
a "Home Improvement Store," defined as a project:
that contains 100,000 square feet or more in a building or
structure ... that sells a large variety of goods, that may
include, but are not limited to, the sale of hardware,
lumber, plumbing supplies, electrical fixtures and sup-
plies, windows, doors, garden supplies, plants and similar
129 Victor Narro, iSi Se Puede! Immigrant Workers and the Transformation of the Los
Angeles Labor and Worker Center Movements, 1 Los Angeles Pub Interest L J 1, 30
(2009).
130 Id at 31-32.
131 See, for example, Gordon, Suburban Sweatshops at 93-97 (cited in note 15).
132 Report of the Chief Legislative Analyst, Funding for New Day Labor Sites, at 1-2
(Feb 13, 2007).
133 LA Ordinance No 180174 (Aug 22, 2008).
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items, used in the maintenance, improvement or expan-
sion of dwellings, buildings or sites. 134
However, unlike the Superstores Ordinance, which man-
dates an economic impact report prior to the issuance of a CUP,
the Home Improvement Stores Ordinance leaves the inclusion of
day labor standards in the CUP process for home improvement
stores to the city's discretion. 35 If the city chooses to require day
labor standards in connection with a home improvement store's
development, such standards may include:
[A] suitable area located on site for Day Laborers seeking
employment with customers [that is] . . . easily accessible
and viewable to Day Laborers seeking employment, as
well as potential employers of these individuals, . . . is lo-
cated so as not to impede or restrict vehicular or pede-
strian access [to or from the store],... is designed to com-
plement the overall design of structures located on the
site, .. . is equipped with a minimum level of easily ac-
cessible and convenient amenities, such as sources of
drinking water, toilet and trash facilities, tables and seat-
ing,... is covered to provide adequate shelter, [and] ... is
open during the hours of operation [of the store] .... 116
The ordinance allows for exemptions if the store can show no
day laborer population exists around the planned site or if it ex-
pects that there is no need for a mitigation plan. In practice,
however, these exemptions will be difficult to prove, although
each CUP will be examined on a case-by-case basis.
c) Redlining: The Grocery Reinvestment Act. The most
current campaign to revise the CUP process is now occurring in
connection with LAANE's Grocery and Retail Campaign. In
2006, LAANE helped to organize the Alliance for Healthy and
Responsible Grocery Stores. Its goal is to promote the develop-
ment of grocery stores in low-income neighborhoods, on the
grounds that it fosters healthy eating and provides quality jobs
134 LA Municipal Code § 12.24(U)(14)(a).
135 Id at § 12.24(U)(14)(e)(1) (stating that the City Planning Commission or City
Council on appeal "may require written Day Laborer operating standards .. as a condi-
tion of approval of any Home Improvement Store").
136 Id at § 12.24(U)(14)(e)(2)(i).
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for local residents. 1 37 The Alliance thus has sought to link public
health and job development.
The backdrop to the formation of the Alliance was the 1992
civil unrest, which produced calls for investment in community-
based grocery stores after the riots revealed deep resentment
over the lack of access to affordable, quality food.1 38 Ten years
later, LAANE reported that only one new grocery store had been
built. 139 In 2003, the Southern California grocery strike chal-
lenged the UFCW's position in the Los Angeles grocery sector,
leading to a set of union contracts with the major groceries that
were uniformly viewed as a defeat for organized labor, establish-
ing a two-tiered employment track that provided new workers
with wages and benefits below what were provided to existing
workers. 140 After the strike, the UFCW joined forces with
LAANE to defeat the Inglewood Wal-Mart Supercenter-the
threat of which was viewed as the primary cause of the strike,
since the groceries argued that they needed wage and benefit
concessions to compete with the impending arrival of nonunio-
nized Wal-Mart stores.141 Another outgrowth was that the
UFCW set out to build a stronger base in low-income communi-
ties, where support for unionized groceries was strong. As a first
step, the union and LAANE convened a blue ribbon commission
to study the grocery sector and issued a report criticizing the lack
of groceries in poor neighborhoods. 142
LAANE-as part of the Alliance for Healthy and Responsible
Grocery Stores143-then began its campaign to develop a "policy
to mitigate the problems of redlining, which leaves low-income
communities without major grocery stores or access to quality,
137 Los Angeles Alliance for a New Economy, Grocery and Retail Campaign: Securing
Quality Jobs for Supermarket Workers and Access to Healthy Food for All Communities,
available at <http://74.10.59.52/laane/projects/grocery/index.html> (last visited Apr 14,
2009).
138 See Gottlieb, et al, The Next Los Angeles at 112-13 (cited in note 16).
139 Los Angeles Alliance for a New Economy, The Supermarket Chains' Broken Prom-
ises to Poor and Minority Communities, available at <http://74.10.59.52/laane/docs/
projects/grocery/FSBrokenPromises.pd> (last visited Aug 5, 2009).
140 Cummings, 95 Cal L Rev at 1955 (cited in note 9).
141 Id.
142 A Call for Standards for Food Access and Job Quality in Los Angeles' Grocery In-
dustry: A Report of the Blue Ribbon Commission on L.A. 's Grocery Industry and Commu-
nity Health (July 2008), available at <http://74.10.59.52/goodgrocery/blueribbon
commissionreport2008.pdf> (last visited Aug 5, 2009).
143 See Alliance for Healthy and Responsible Grocery Stores, Members, available at
<http://74.10.59.52/goodgrocery/whoweare.html> (last visited Aug 5, 2009).
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healthy foods." 144 The use of the term "redlining" deliberately
evokes the shameful practice by commercial banks of refusing to
write mortgages to residents of low-income communities of col-
or-literally drawing a red line on a map identifying the ex-
cluded neighborhoods. 145 By associating grocery store develop-
ment decisions with bank lending practices, LAANE has sought
to both portray grocery disinvestment in geographic terms and
suggest the outlines of a possible solution. In the banking con-
text, the Community Reinvestment Act encourages banks to
meet the credit needs of the "entire community, including low-
and moderate-income neighborhoods." 146 To similarly encourage
groceries to meet the needs of low-income communities, LAANE
is again focusing on modifying the CUP process: "Since virtually
every new supermarket must apply for a Conditional Use Permit
(CUP), LAANE proposes that the L.A. Planning Commission and
City Council add a condition to the CUP application requiring
compliance with anti-redlining and food and job quality crite-
ria."1 47 The content of such a CUP application is not yet deter-
mined, but presumably would require grocery stores to commit to
distribute the development of stores across affluent and low-
income neighborhoods as a prerequisite for a CUP to be issued.
C. The Regulatory Model: The LAX Enhancement
Zone Ordinance
In addition to using its procurement and land use planning
powers to affect the low-wage market, Los Angeles, like other
cities, has drawn upon its fundamental police power to directly
impose regulations designed to promote the public welfare. Cities
are given broad grants of statutory or constitutional power under
home rule authority to set local standards. Los Angeles has used
its police power authority to enact legislation that directly im-
pacts employment standards in targeted low-wage industries.
Most prominently, in 2008 the Los Angeles City Council passed a
new living wage law that-unlike the ordinance passed in 1997
that imposes living wage requirements on businesses with direct
144 Los Angeles Alliance for a New Economy, Grocery and Retail Campaign (cited in
note 137).
145 See Melvin L. Oliver & Thomas M. Shapiro, Black Wealth/White Wealth: A New
Perspective on Racial Inequality 16-23 (Routledge 1997).
146 12 USC § 2903.
147 Los Angeles Alliance for a New Economy, Grocery and Retail Campaign (cited in
note 137).
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fiscal links to the cities-mandates that hotels operating in the
vicinity of LAX pay workers at the living wage rate. 148 This law,
in contrast to its predecessor, is place-based rather than contin-
gent on city contracts. In this sense, the airport living wage or-
dinance-called the LAX Enhancement Zone Ordinance--
resembles a direct minimum wage increase, but only for desig-
nated employers in a specific geographic area.
As of 2006, there were four cities that had enacted city-wide
minimum wage increases (Albuquerque, New Mexico; Washing-
ton, D.C.; Santa Fe, New Mexico; and San Francisco, Califor-
nia).149 Legal challenges to these laws (as with the contract-based
living wage laws discussed earlier) have revolved in part around
the question of state preemption-whether state minimum wage
laws preclude localities from enacting their own that exceed state
thresholds. Place-based living wage laws, like the one in Santa
Fe, New Mexico that imposes a city-wide living wage rate for
most businesses, 150 have withstood challenges on preemption
grounds. 15 1 The LAX Enhancement Zone Ordinance, however, is
the first to apply to private employers in a certain industry with-
in a smaller geographical area. 15 2 While it is unique in its geo-
graphic scope and lack of contracting requirements, its suppor-
ters argue that it still relies on indirect public financial relation-
ships as the trigger for the hotel living wage mandates. Specifi-
148 LA Municipal Code §§ 104.101-104.115.
149 There were four other cities in Wisconsin that had enacted city-wide living wage
laws (Eau Claire, Lacrosse, Madison, and Milwaukee), which were subsequently repealed
by state law in 2005.
150 In addition to covering city employees, contractors, and businesses receiving finan-
cial assistance from the city, the Santa Fe ordinance applies to "[blusinesses required to
have a business license or business registration from the city of Santa Fe who, during any
given month, have twenty-five (25) or more workers .. " Santa Fe Living Wage Ordin-
ance, § 2S-1.5(A)(1)-(4).
151 New Mexicans for Free Enterprise v City of Santa Fe, 126 P 3d 1149 (NM Ct App
2005). See also Christine Niemczyk, Comment, Boxing Out Big Box Retailers: The Legal
and Social Impact of Big Box Living Wage Legislation, 40 J Marshall L Rev 1339, 135 1-
53 (2007).
152 Some cities have passed ordinances covering areas that are publicly owned or
controlled. San Francisco passed an ordinance applying to workers in San Francisco Air-
port in 1999. Michael Reich, Peter Hall, and Ken Jacobs, Living Wage Policies at the San
Francisco Airport: Impacts on Workers and Businesses, 44 Indus Relat 106, 107 (2005).
Berkeley's ordinance applies to businesses over a certain size operating in the Berkeley
Marina, which is held in public trust. RUI One Corp, 371 F3d at 1144-46. In 2001, an
ordinance similar to the LAX Enhancement Zone Ordinance was passed in Santa Monica,
California, which applied to all firms (mostly hotels) within a 1.5 mile Coastal Zone along
Santa Monica's beachfront. Erskine and Marblestone, The Movement Takes the Lead at
251 (cited in note 35). This ordinance, however, was defeated in a citywide referendum
that was marred by a disinformation campaign by business opponents to the law. Id at
254.
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cally, they argue that the hotels "derive significant and unique
business benefits from their close proximity to LAX" and may
therefore be required to meet city-imposed wage standards.
53
The campaign for the LAX ordinance began in 2006 when
labor and community organizers launched an effort to extend the
existing living wage ordinance to hotel workers along Century
Boulevard, the main thoroughfare leading into LAX, which is
lined with large hotels catering to travelers. As with the cam-
paign for the 1997 Los Angeles Living Wage Ordinance, LAANE
spearheaded the organizing drive, this time in coordination with
UNITE HERE, the merged garment and hotel union that has
focused on organizing low-wage workers. 5 4 In addition to
LAANE and UNITE HERE, the Coalition for a New Century, as
it was called, included familiar economic justice players, includ-
ing the Los Angeles County Federation of Labor and CLUE. The
coalition organized numerous protests, including one "sit down"
in the middle of Century Boulevard in which over three hundred
people were arrested, including two city council members.
155
With the support of labor-friendly city council members and
Mayor Antonio Villaraigosa-a former union organizer-the coa-
lition succeeded in getting the ordinance approved on November
15, 2006, and signed by Mayor Villaraigosa on November 27,
2006.156
Following the passage of the ordinance, the business lobby
quickly mobilized a counter-effort to collect enough signatures to
hold a ballot referendum to repeal the law. Calling themselves
Save LA Jobs, the group's backers included hotel representatives
and the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce. 157 Mayor Villaraigo-
sa and the city council attempted to broker a deal with industry
representatives in an effort to circumvent the referendum, which
it was estimated would have cost the city $2.5 million dollars.
153 LA Municipal Code § 104.101.
154 UNITE HERE was formed in 2004 from the merger of the formerly independent
unions UNITE and HERE. UNITE HERE is part of the Change to Win coalition of unions
that split from the AFL-CIO, in part, to focus more energy on organizing low-wage and
immigrant workers. In May 2009, however, a large faction of UNITE workers left the
merged union to become an affiliate of the SEIU called Workers United. Peter Dreier,
Divorce-Union Style, The Nation (Aug 12, 2009).
155 Joe Mathews, Unions Targeting the LAX Area, LA Times B1 (Nov 25, 2006); Peter
Dreier, Living-Wage Victory in LA, The Nation (Feb 5, 2007).
156 Joe Mathews and Duke Helfand, Airport Hotels Ordered to Pay a "Living Wage,"
LA Times Al (Nov 16, 2006); Duke Helfand, Mayor Signs 'Living Wage" Law, LA Times
B4 (Nov 28, 2006).
157 Jim Newton, Deception Alleged in Petition Bid, LA Times B3 (Dec 16, 2006); Joe
Mathews, "Living Wage"Foes Collect Signatures, LA Times B5 (Dec 29, 2006).
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The city council rescinded the original ordinance and agreed to
negotiate a new one more favorable to the hotels.158
With the apparent backing of the business groups, the city
council passed the revised ordinance in February 2007.' 59 The
ordinance included the same living wage rates as the repealed
ordinance ($9.39 with health benefits and $10.64 without), but
added a number of new provisions, including a phased-in imple-
mentation, as well as the inclusion of an "Airport Hospitality
Enhancement Zone" that would provide hotels with financial in-
centives for infrastructure and other modernization projects. 16 0
In addition, the revised ordinance required the city to study its
effect on the hotels, their customers, and the workers, and also
implemented new "procedures for further regulation" designed to
create standards for the enactment of any further living wage
laws. 161 As part of these procedures, the city agreed to conduct a
study (with the opportunity for public input) prior to the enact-
ment of new living wage laws and to refrain from imposing new
living 6age requirements "unless the industry and region to be
regulated receive business benefits stemming from a City asset
that match or exceed the benefit from proximity to LAX received
by Hotels in the Airport Hospitality Enhancement Zone." 162
However, despite the apparent accord in support of the re-
vised LAX ordinance, the hotels immediately filed a legal chal-
lenge to the new law, arguing that it was not substantially dif-
ferent from the previous one and therefore the city's decision to
rescind the initial version of the ordinance was an illegal attempt
to circumvent the referendum process. 163 A superior court judge
agreed and ruled to block the living wage ordinance from going
into effect. The court of appeals unanimously reversed the trial
court, holding that the new ordinance was not essentially similar
to the old and therefore not barred by the rule against repeal.1 64
158 Joe Mathews, Deal May Be Near on "Living Wage" Vote, LA Times B1 (Jan 31,
2007).
159 LA Ordinance No 178432, amending LA Municipal Code ch X, art 4 (Feb 26, 2007).
160 LA Municipal Code §§ 104.103, 104.106.
161 Id at § 104.144. See also Joe Mathews and Duke Helfand, Battle Over Living Wage
Skirted, LA Times B1 (Feb 1, 2007); Peter Dreier, Living-Wage Victory in LA, The Nation
(cited in note 155).
162 LA Municipal Code § 104.114(B). These procedures can be bypassed "if the indus-
try to be regulated has so many employees being paid less than living wage as to have a
significant negative effect on the City economy as a whole." Id at § 104.114(C).
163 Joe Mathews and Steve Hymon, Council OKs New Living Wage Law, LA Times B3
(Feb 14, 2007).
164 Rubalcava v Martinez, 158 Cal App 4th 563, 576-577 (Cal App Ct 2008). See also
Steve Hymon, L.A. Living Wage Law is Upheld, LA Times B1 (Dec 28, 2007).
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The hotels appealed yet again, this time to the state supreme
court, which eventually declined to hear the case, effectively end-
ing the hotels' legal challenge. Following the California Supreme
Court's decision, most of the hotels began implementing the liv-
ing wage. However, Hilton decided to continue the fight alone
and challenged the ordinance on equal protection grounds in fed-
eral court; that case was also dismissed. 165 The ordinance is ex-
pected to cover up to 3,500 hotel workers within the Enhance-
ment Zone.166
II. IMPLICATIONS
It is not possible to draw robust, generalizable conclusions
about the role of local government law in reshaping the low-wage
workplace based solely on the Los Angeles experience, which is a
product of the city's particular political and economic context.
Nor can we make any strong claims about the future role of local
government law in fostering worker organizing or restructuring
low-wage industries particularly given the significant domestic
political realignment, which has made national-level policy mak-
ing on labor issues potentially more appealing and plausible.
Nonetheless, it is possible to step back from the details of the
policies we have catalogued here to discern general patterns that
may be helpful in guiding scholars and activists interested in the
potential of local government law as a lever of low-wage market
reform. Toward this end, this Part examines some of the oppor-
tunities and constraints associated with local low-wage worker
initiatives by cataloguing the actors involved, highlighting the
industry sectors targeted for local regulation, identifying policy
objectives, examining how the initiatives are framed to policy
makers, suggesting basic criteria to assess policy impact, and
exploring the central challenge of replication.
165 Howard Fine, L.A. Living Wage Law Upheld, LA Bus J (Apr 11, 2008), available at
<http://www.labusinessjournal.com/article.asp?aID=87294014.8540134.1 61 1558.7978890
3.1710826.256&aID2=123957> (last visited Apr 9, 2009); Howard Fine, Hilton Takes Last
Stand in War on "Living Wage," 30 LA Bus J 27 (July 7, 2008), available at
<http://www.encyclopedia.com/docdlGl-181855574.html> (last visited Aug 5, 2009); How-
ard Fine, Judge Dismisses Hotel's Suit Against Living Wage, LA Bus J (Oct 2, 2008),
available at <http://www.communitybenefits.org/downloads/Judge%20Dismisses% 2OHotel
%20Suit%20Against%20Living/o20Wage%2010.2.08.pdf'> (last visited Apr 9, 2009).
166 Duke Helfand, Mayor Signs "Living Wage"Law, LA Times B4 (Nov 28, 2006).
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A. Actors
Which groups have sponsored low-wage worker initiatives
and who are their allies? These initiatives are a product of new,
flexible forms of labor activism in which community groups, labor
unions, and workers come together in different organizational
configurations out of a sense of strategic solidarity to advance a
range of objectives, including organizing, education, and policy
reform. Table 1 lists the Los Angeles low-wage worker initiatives
discussed above and provides information about the organiza-
tional composition of the coalitions that advanced them, includ-
ing the lead community organizations, union partners, and other
organizations that participated as coalition allies.
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TABLE 1: ORGANIZATIONAL SPONSORS
Initiative f Coalition Organizations in Coalition
LA Living LA Living Lead Organization: LAANE
Wage Ord. Wage Coal. Union Partners: HERE, SEIU
(1997) Coalition Members: ACORN, AGENDA, Cal. Immigrant Workers Ass'n, Cal.
Network for a New Economy, CLUE, Coalition LA, Communities for a Better
Env't, Esperanza Cmty. Housing Corp., UCLA Labor Ctr.
Figueroa Lead Organization: SAJE
Corridor Union Partners: HERE, SEIU
Coal. for Coalition Members: ACORN, AGENDA, All People's Christian Ctr., Blazers
Econ. Youth Servs., Budlong & Jefferson Block Club, Cent. American Resource Center,
Justice CHIRLA, Coal. LA, Comty. Coal., Concerned Citizens of S. Cent. LA, El Restate,
Envtl. Defense, Episcopal Church of St. Phillip the Evangelist, Esperanza Cmty.
Housing Corp., Faithful Serv. Baptist Church, First United Methodist Church,
LAANE, Neighbors for an Improved Cmty., St. Agnes Catholic Church, St. John's
Episcopal Church, St. John's Well Child Ctr., St. Mark's Lutheran Church,
Cmty. Benefits Student Coal. Against Labor Exploitation, United Univ. Church
Agreements LAX Coal. Lead Organization: LAANE
(2001, 2004, for Econ., Union Partners: SEIU, Teamsters
2007) Envtl. & Coalition Members: AGENDA, AME Minister's Alliance, Cal. Envtl. Rights
Educational Alliance, CLUE, Coal. for Clean Air, Communities for a Better Env't, Cmty.
Justice Coal., Cmty. Coal. for Change, Envtl. Defense, Inglewood Coal. for Drug &
Violence Prevention, Inglewood Democratic Club, Lenox Coordinating Council,
LA Council of Churches, Nation of Islam-LA, Natural Resources Defense
Council, Physicians for Social Responsibility Los Angeles
Grand Ave. Lead Organization: SAJE
Comm. Union Partners: None
Benefits Coalition Members: CD Tech, Concerned Citizens of South Central LA, LA
Coal. Cmty. Action Network
Superstores Coal. for a Lead Organization: LAANE
Ord. (2004) Better Union Partners: UFCW, UNITE HERE
Inglewood Coalition Members: CLUE, Coal. LA, Cmty. Coal., Inglewood Coal. for Drug &
Violence Prevt'n, Inglewood Democratic Club, Neighbor to Neighbor Action Fund
Sweat-Free Anti-Sweat. Lead Organization: Sweatshop Watch
Proc. Ord. Ord. Union Partners: UNITE
(2004) Working Coalition Members: GWC, No More Sweatshops, Progressive Jewish Alliance
Group
LAX Coal. for a Lead Organization: LAANE
Enhancem't New Union Partners: UNITE HERE
Zone Ord. Century Coalition Members: Christ Liberty Tabernacle, CLUE, Coal. for a Better
(2007) Inglewood, Congregation B'nai Tikvah, Hamilton United Methodist Church, Holy
Faith Episcopal Church, Inglewood Coal. for the Prevention of Drugs & Violence,
LAX Coal. for Econ., Envt'I & Educ. Justice, Progressive Jewish Alliance
Home Improv't NDLON Lead Organization: NDLON
Stores Ord. Union Partners: None
(2008) Coalition Members: NDLON member organizations (CHILRA, IDEPSCA)
CRA Constr. Constr. Lead Organization: LAANE
Careers & Careers Union Partners: LA Co. Fed. of Labor
Project Initiative Coalition Members: AGENDA, Bethel A.M.E., Black Trade Unionists,
Stabilization Coal. Communities in Schools, Cmty. Coal., Ex-Offender Action Network, Homeboy
Policy (2008) Indus., LA/Orange Co. Building Trades Council, S. Christian Leadership
Conference, UCLA Labor Ctr., United Job Creation Council
Clean Trucks Coal. for Lead Organization: LAANE
Program (2008) Clean & Union Partners: Change to Win, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, Int'l Brotherhood of
Safe Ports Electrical Workers, LA Co. Fed. of Labor, SEIU, Teamsters, UNITE HERE
Coalition Members: Am. Lung Ass'n of Cal., CHIRLA, CLUE, Coal. for Clean
Air, Coal. for a Safe Environment, Communities for a Better Envt., Communities
for Clean Ports, East Yard Communities for Envt'l Justice, Engineers &
Architects Ass'n LA, Green LA Port Working Group, Harbor Watts Econ. Dev.
Corp., Hermandad Mexicans Latinoamericana, LA/Long Beach Labor Coalition,
Long Beach Alliance for Children with Asthma, Long Beach Cmty. Partners
Council, Long Beach Greens, Mexican Am. Political Ass'n, NAACP
Carson/Torrance, Natural Resources Defense Council, Physicians for Social
Responsibility, Progressive Christians Uniting, San Pedro Democratic Club,
Sierra Club Harbor Vision Task Force, Teachers Ass'n of Long Beach, S. Cal.
Council of Laborers
Grocery Reinv. Alliance for Lead Organization: LAANE
Act (pending) Healthy & Union Partners: LA Co. Fed. of Labor, SEIU, UFCW
Resp. Coalition Members: AGENDA, Alliance for Democracy-LA Chapter, Asian Pac.
Grocery Am. Labor Alliance, Cal. Ass'n of Profrl Employees, Cal. Food & Justice Coal.,
Stores CLUE, Coal. for Clean Air, Coal. LA, Cmty. Coal., Cmty. Health Council, Cmty.
Serve. Unlimited, IDEPSCA, Iraq Veterans Against the War, Korean Immigrant
Workers Advocates, LA Voice PICO, Livable Places, Northeast Democratic Club
of LA, Plaza Cmty. Ctr., UCLA Labor Ctr., Urban & Envt'l Policy Inst.
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A number of interesting patterns emerge. First, with respect
to the lead organizations, LAANE has been the key player in
promoting local low-wage worker initiatives, playing a lead role
in six of the nine initiatives. The only two initiatives in which
LAANE was not involved were those that grew directly out of
immigrant worker organizing-with the Sweat-Free Procure-
ment Ordinance emerging out of antisweatshop organizing in the
garment industry led by Sweatshop Watch, the Garment Worker
Center, and APALC, and the Home Improvement Stores Ordin-
ance promoted by NDLON and its member organizations,
IDEPSCA and CHIRLA. We treat CBAs as a single initiative,
but note that LAANE played different roles in the three main
agreements negotiated in Los Angeles: LAANE played a suppor-
tive role to SAJE in the Figueroa Corridor Coalition, took the
lead in the LAX Coalition, and was not involved in the Grand
Avenue Community Benefits Coalition. In the remaining six in-
itiatives (Los Angeles Living Wage Ordinance, Superstores Or-
dinance, LAX Enhancement Zone Ordinance, CRA Construction
Careers and Project Stabilization Policy, Clean Trucks Program,
and Grocery Reinvestment Act), LAANE organized and staffed
the coalitions responsible for advancing the campaigns. It is im-
portant to highlight that these LAANE-led initiatives have the
strongest connection to the organized labor movement in that
each has resulted in (or, in the case of the Grocery Reinvestment
Act, is seeking to result in) a local ordinance that indirectly sup-
ports unionization-a point to which we return below in our dis-
cussion of objectives. This union nexus follows from the origin
and mission of LAANE, which was formed with union backing to
mediate between unions and community groups in order to ad-
vance a progressive labor agenda. 167 By contrast, the Sweat-Free
Procurement Ordinance and Home Improvement Stores Ordin-
ance reflect efforts by immigrant rights groups to benefit non-
unionized immigrant workers. In the community benefits con-
text, the leadership of SAJE in the Figueroa Corridor and Grand
Avenue campaigns suggests its influence as a grassroots com-
munity organizing group focused on development and displace-
ment in the downtown area, where both projects are located.
167 LAANE's board of directors includes the president of the Los Angeles County Fed-
eration of Labor, the director of the UCLA Labor Center, the regional coordinator of the
SEIU, the business manager of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, the
regional organizing directory for the Teamsters, and the president of UNITE HERE. See
LAANE, Board of Directors, available at <http://74.10.59.52/laane/board.html> (last vi-
sited Aug 5, 2009).
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The pattern of union involvement follows a similar logic. In
general, the presence of unions as partners in particular initia-
tives suggests potential linkages between the initiatives and the
unions' membership. For example, the UFCW's involvement with
the Superstores Ordinance reflected its interest in protecting
unionized grocery workers from Wal-Mart; UNITE HERE's in-
volvement in the LAX Enhancement Zone Ordinance was related
to its hotel unionization drive; the Teamsters support of the
Clean Trucks Program reflected the fact that it would have con-
verted drivers into truck company employees open to unioniza-
tion; and the UFCW's support for the Grocery Reinvestment Act
again suggests its interest in promoting unionized groceries in
low-income neighborhoods. The involvement of a broader range
of unions without direct stakes in some of the initiatives may
reflect an effort to promote interunion solidarity and cross-
jurisdictional collaboration. Also, it is significant that the unions
involved in these campaigns are predominantly Change to Win
unions, with the SEIU, UNITE HERE, UFCW, and Teamsters
playing central roles.
Finally, the list of allied organizations reveals important
connections and continuities. For one, there is a strong presence
of progressive religious groups that spans across the initiatives.
Beginning with the Living Wage Ordinance in 1997, CLUE-the
coalition of religious organizations formed during the living wage
campaign to support low-wage workers-has been a steadfast
supporter of low-wage worker initiatives, particularly those ad-
vanced by LAANE. CLUE was a coalition member in all of the
initiatives in which LAANE was the lead organization except in
the Construction Careers Initiative Coalition, which likely re-
flects the fact that the CRA policy did not involve large-scale
community mobilizations (in part because LAANE's director,
Madeline Janis, is also a CRA Commissioner). The Progressive
Jewish Alliance was another group whose political commitment
to economic justice drove its involvement in the Anti-Sweatshop
Ordinance Working Group and Coalition for a New Century.
While CLUE's consistent involvement across initiatives is ex-
plained by its broad antipoverty mission, the involvement of oth-
er religious groups in initiative campaigns often suggests more
particularized organizational interests. For example, in the Fi-
gueroa Corridor Coalition, the participation of church groups like
Episcopal Church of St. Phillip the Evangelist, St. Mark's Luthe-
ran Church, and United University Church stemmed from their
physical location in the Figueroa Corridor community and their
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connection to residents affected by development pressures. Simi-
larly, the Coalition for a New Century included a number of local
churches.
Environmental groups played important roles in initiatives
with environmental justice connections: the California Environ-
mental Rights Alliance, Environmental Defense, Communities
for a Better Environment ("CBE"), and the Natural Resources
Defense Council ("NRDC") in the LAX Coalition, which advo-
cated for noise reduction measures as part of the CBA; CBE, the
NRDC and a number of other environmental groups in the Clean
Trucks Program, which sought to reduce truck diesel emissions.
Similarly, community development organizations-Esperanza
Community Housing Corporation and Concerned Citizens for
South Central Los Angeles-were prominent in CBA campaigns
with a focus on affordable housing (Figueroa Corridor and Grand
Avenue). Finally, grassroots community organizing groups
ACORN, AGENDA, and the Community Coalition played a role
in a number of campaign coalitions: Los Angeles Living Wage
(ACORN, AGENDA); Figueroa Corridor (ACORN, AGENDA,
Community Coalition); LAX Coalition (AGENDA, Community
Coalition); Coalition for a Better Inglewood (Community Coali-
tion); Construction Careers Initiative Coalition (AGENDA,
Community Coalition); and Alliance for Healthy and Responsible
Grocery Stores (AGENDA, Community Coalition).
B. Industry Targets
Which industries do the low-wage initiatives seek to regu-
late? In general, the turn to local government law as a way of
impacting the low-wage market grows out of the broader econom-
ic restructuring over the past half-century that has altered the
terrain of work. The basic story is familiar and well documented:
there has been a significant shift from mass industrial produc-
tion-anchored in one location and centered on a single large
firm-to "flexible" production arrangements that transcend geo-
graphic boundaries and cut across many firms. 168 This shift is the
product of the complex interplay of macroeconomic forces (the
liberalization of global trade and capital), technological change
(the transformation in communications), and organizational re-
structuring within firms (the demise of internal labor markets
168 See Lichtenstein, State of the Union at 215 (cited in note 3); Stone, From Widgets
to Digits at 67-86 (cited in note 3).
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and the rise of part-time employment, contingent work, and sub-
contracting). 169 The reorganization of production has, in turn,
undercut traditional unionism based on single-employer drives
for majority worker recognition, 170 contributing to the steep de-
cline in private sector union density. 171 Against this backdrop,
some commentators have called for a "new agenda" for organized
labor adapted to the realities of contemporary economic organi-
zation. 72 A centerpiece of this strategy is the identification of
appropriate targets for labor organizing and policy initiatives.
Because of the risks of capital flight inherent in the globalized
manufacturing sector, increased attention has been focused on
targeting nonexportable industries tied to local economies-
because they offer inherently immobile services, have fiscal ties
to local governments, or gain economic benefits through associa-
tion with larger regional economies. 73
Before looking at the industries targeted by the Los Angeles
initiatives, it is useful to provide a picture of the trajectory of the
Los Angeles economy and how it has impacted low-wage work.
From 1996 to 2006, the trends in Los Angeles followed broader
national patterns, with manufacturing jobs declining by more
than 170 thousand, replaced largely by jobs in the service sec-
tor. 74 The ten industries that posted the largest growth over the
decade were all in the service sector: (1) leisure and hospitality;
(2) health and social services; (3) professional and business ser-
vices; (4) retail trade; (5) construction; (6) financial activities; (7)
educational services; (8) wholesale trade; (9) other services;175
169 See generally Katherine V.W. Stone, Flexibilization, Globalization, and Privatiza-
tion: The Three Challenges to Labor Rights in Our Time, 44 Osgoode Hall L J 77 (2006).
170 See Joel Rogers, A Strategy for Labor, 34 Indus Rel 367, 368-81 (1995).
171 Stone, From Widgets to Digits at 196 (cited in note 3).
172 Lichtenstein, State of the Union at 260 (cited in note 3).
173 See Stone, 44 Osgoode Hall L J at 90-92 (cited in note 169).
174 See Los Angeles Alliance for a New Economy, Poverty, Jobs and the Los Angeles
Economy: An Analysis of U.S. Census Data and the Challenges Facing Our Region 9
(2007) [hereinafter LAANE, 2007 Census Analysis]. See also Paul More, et al, The Other
Los Angeles: The Working Poor in the City of the 21st Century vii (Los Angeles Alliance for
a New Economy 2000) available at <http://74.10.59.52/laane/docs/research/TheOther
LosAngeles es.pdf> (last visited Sept 8, 2009) (noting that service sector employment had
increased by nearly 50 percent between 1985 and 2000, contributing to the growth of the
working poor in Los Angeles to approximately one million workers).
175 "Other services" include "activities such as equipment and machinery repairing,
promoting or administering religious activities, grantmaking, advocacy, and providing
drycleaning and laundry services, personal care service, death care services, pet care
services, photofinishing services, temporary parking services, and dating services. Private
households that engage in employing workers on or about the premises in activities pri-
marily concerned with the operation of the household are included in this sector." U.S.
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and (10) transportation. 176 Drawing upon 2006 U.S. Census data,
LAANE ranked these industries by poverty rate, measured as
the percent of workers within each industry with incomes below
200 percent of the federal poverty line for a family of four. Those
industries with the highest poverty rates were: leisure and hos-
pitality (39.9 percent); construction (37.8 percent); other services
(37.8 percent); retail trade (32.4 percent); wholesale trade (27.1
percent); transportation (25.1 percent); professional and business
services (24.3 percent); and health and social services (21.3 per-
cent).177
Table 2 lists the industry categories targeted by the Los An-
geles low-wage worker initiatives. As it shows, the proponents of
the Los Angeles initiatives are largely following the strategy of
targeting geographically anchored service sector industries that
are characterized by both high rates of growth and poverty.
TABLE 2: Low-WAGE WORKER INITIATIVE BY INDUSTRY
Jiptiav.Target.4Worer Industry Categtory
LA Living Wage Ord. Airline services, bus services * Transportation
* Janitorial, security, parking * Professional and business services
* Landscape maintenance * Other services
* Retail and food services Retail trade; leisure and hospitality
* Social services, home health care Health and social services
Cmty. Benefits • Construction * Construction
Agreements * Hotel, restaurant, entertainment * Leisure and hospitality services
* Janitorial, security * Professional and business services
SRetail Retail trade
Superstores Ord. Grocery * Retail trade
Sweat-Free Proc. Ord. Garment Manufacturing
LAX Enhance ,'t Zone Hotel ALeisure and hospitality se ces
Ord.
Home Improv't Stores Day labor a Construction; other services
Ord.
CRA Constr. Careers Construction s a Construction
& Project
Stabilization Policy
Clean Trucks •Trucking •Transportation
Program
Grocery Reinv. Act LGrocery Retail trade
These industry patterns suggest that the proponents of the
Los Angeles low-wage worker initiatives are promoting sectoral
strategies targeted not at specific firms but rather at occupation-
al categories within regionally specific industry clusters. 17s With
the exception of the Sweat-Free Procurement Ordinance (which
Census Bureau, 81 Other Services (except Public Administration), available at <http://
www.census.gov/econ/census02/naics/sector8l/81.htm> Olast visited Aug 27, 2009).
176 LAANE, 2007 Census Analysis at 10 (cited in note 174).
177 Los Angeles Alliance for a New Economy, Poverty, Jobs and the Los Angeles Econ-
omy: An Annual Analysis of U.S. Census Data and the Challenges Facing Our Region 11
(2008) [hereinafter LAANE, 2008 Census Analysis].
178 Rogers, 34 Indus Re] at 375 (cited in note 170).
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targets garment companies with local contracts), all of the initia-
tives are in service industries dependent on the local economy in
ways that permit regulation without the threat of outsourcing.
Seven of the initiatives are focused on single industries: the Su-
perstores Ordinance regulates big-box retail stores; the Sweat-
Free Procurement Ordinance targets garment companies; the
LAX Enhancement Zone is focused on raising wages in the Cen-
tury Corridor hotels; the Home Improvement Stores Ordinance
creates day labor sites at big-box home improvement stores; the
CRA Construction Careers and Project Stabilization Policy seeks
to create job ladders in the construction trades; the Clean Trucks
Program attempts to promote unionization in the trucking sec-
tor; and the Grocery Reinvestment Act again targets the grocery
sector. The Los Angeles Living Wage Ordinance, as a general
living wage policy covering employers with fiscal ties to the city,
is targeted to multiple industries, but in practice has primarily
affected workers in security and parking, airline services (such
as baggage handlers and security screeners), janitorial services,
retail and food services, social services, landscape maintenance,
and other workers in areas such as bus services and home health
care.179 CBAs vary by project, but are generally designed to affect
workers in the construction industry (through local hiring provi-
sions); workers for employers with contracts with the developer,
such as security and maintenance companies (through living
wage and worker retention provisions); and workers for the ulti-
mate project tenants, such as restaurants, hotels, retail stores,
and entertainment venues (through living wage provisions).
C. Objectives
What goals do the low-wage worker initiatives seek to
achieve? Our review suggests that the initiatives advance mul-
tiple and often overlapping goals: some indirectly support unio-
nization, while others promote alternative workplace and labor
movement objectives. Specifically, we identify six initiative goals:
(1) creating favorable conditions for future union organizing, (2)
raising standards, (3) rewarding labor-friendly employers, (4)
developing training programs and job ladders for low-wage
workers, (5) enhancing organized labor's political capital, and (6)
promoting alliances between organized labor and other consti-
tuencies.
179 Fairris, et al, Examining the Evidence at 10 (cited in note 36).
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1. Promoting unionization.
While community-labor alliances are designed to break open
the traditional paradigm of union recognition and collective bar-
gaining, union partners nonetheless remain committed to pro-
moting traditional forms of employee representation. According-
ly, an important objective of some low-wage worker initiatives is
to change background legal rules in ways that reshape worker
bargaining power in order to promote unionization. An example
of this is the Los Angeles Superstores Ordinance, passed in the
wake of the Inglewood Wal-Mart campaign. That ordinance,
which requires the city to approve a community impact report
before authorizing big-box development, operates to give orga-
nized labor more leverage-both with Wal-Mart and with local
grocery stores. By threatening to block a Wal-Mart Supercenter
development, the law gives leverage to organized labor to nego-
tiate a collective bargaining agreement or, less ambitiously, a
community benefits agreement with Wal-Mart as a condition of
its market entry. As a practical matter, to the degree that Wal-
Mart would prefer not to enter the Los Angeles market under
these terms, the law operates as a buffer that improves the bar-
gaining position of the UFCW in negotiations with local grocery
stores such as Albertsons, Kroger, and Safeway. As mentioned
above, these groceries used the threat of Wal-Mart's entry to win
steep concessions from the union in 2003, most significantly the
two-tier wage and benefit structure for new hires.180 After Wal-
Mart was defeated and the Superstores Ordinance was passed,
the specter of Wal-Mart undercutting unionized grocery prices
because of low-cost labor was eliminated, enhancing the UFCW's
bargaining power. As evidence of this, in its most recent grocery
contract negotiations in 2007, the UFCW was able to win impor-
tant modifications of the two-tier wage and benefit structure that
reestablish parity between new and old workers.181
The Los Angeles Port Clean Trucks Program is another ex-
ample of an initiative designed to facilitate unionization. By re-
quiring trucking companies to treat drivers as employees rather
than as independent contractors as part of their concession
agreements, the program attempted to create the potential for
the Teamsters to organize drivers.
180 Cummings, 95 Cal L Rev at 1955 (cited in note 9).
181 Jerry Hirsh, Grocery Strike Averted as Chains, Union Reach Accord, LA Times Al
(July 18, 2007).
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Living wage ordinances may also serve to restructure the or-
ganizing terrain. Traditional living wage ordinances (like the Los
Angeles ordinance) that operate through city contracting may
function to protect public employee unions by reducing the finan-
cial incentive to outsource public functions to private contractors.
Additionally, although living wage laws are not necessarily tied
to labor organizing campaigns, they can be. The campaign for the
LAX Enhancement Zone Ordinance provides one example. Prior
to the passage of the ordinance, UNITE HERE targeted the LAX
hotels as a key battleground in their national campaign to organ-
ize hotel workers. The ordinance offered an additional source of
leverage for the union in its organizing drive. By reducing the
disparity between unionized wages and the locally mandated
living wage, the ordinance reduced the cost to the hotels of unio-
nization, making the benefits of labor peace more attractive. In
addition, the LAX Enhancement Zone Ordinance created an ex-
emption for hotels under union contract,18 2 thus providing the
hotels another incentive to unionize to the degree that a collec-
tive bargaining agreement might be viewed as providing greater
employer flexibility than the living wage law.18 3
2. Raising standards.
In addition to potentially supporting unionization, living
wage laws also advance another goal: raising minimum industry
standards above existing federal and state baselines that are
deemed inadequate. CBAs also seek to raise minimum standards
in low-wage industries, albeit on a targeted project-by-project
basis and typically in a weaker fashion. For example, the living
wage provision in the Figueroa Corridor agreement provides that
the "Developer shall make all reasonable efforts to maximize the
number of living wage jobs in the Project," agreeing to a 70 per-
cent living wage goal.184 Ultimately, failure to comply with the 70
percent living wage goal does not breach the agreement. Instead,
the agreement provides that even if the living wage goal is not
met, developer compliance is presumed so long as the developer
makes annual living wage reports (detailing the problems of
182 LA Municipal Code § 104.110.
183 The broader Los Angeles Living Wage Ordinance may also be superseded by a
collective bargaining agreement. LA Admin Code § 10.37.12. However, the Los Angeles
Living Wage Ordinance has not generally been linked so closely to specific unionization
drives.
184 Cummings, Mobilization Lawyering at 322 (cited in note 88).
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meeting the living wage goal), notifies the coalition before select-
ing project tenants, meets with the coalition and prospective te-
nants to discuss living wage requirements, and "within commer-
cially reasonable limits" takes into account "as a substantial fac-
tor" the impact of tenant selection on the living wage goal.18 5 By
creating an aspirational goal, the agreement gives the coalition
leverage to pressure living wage compliance by threatening the
developer with negative press for failure to live up to its prom-
ise.186
The Los Angeles Sweat-Free Procurement Ordinance also
seeks to raise industry standards by requiring payment of a "pro-
curement living wage" equal to the federal poverty line plus 20
percent for contractors that provide "garments, uniforms, foot
apparel, and related accessories.' 8 7
3. Enforcing legal requirements by rewarding
good employers.
The Los Angeles Sweat-Free Procurement Ordinance, while
it aims to raise standards among apparel contractors, also seeks
to simply enforce minimum legal requirements against city sup-
pliers. It does this by requiring contractors to agree to a Code of
Conduct in which they aver compliance with domestic and inter-
national labor laws and agree to accept close monitoring of labor
practices.188 The ordinance therefore aims to enhance enforce-
185 Id at 328.
186 Outside of Los Angeles, another example of an initiative that relies on the local
police power to raise standards is the San Francisco Health Care Security Ordinance,
passed in 2006. The ordinance is designed to provide health insurance regardless of em-
ployment and immigration status, while also imposing minimum health care require-
ments on employers. First, the Health Access Program provides coverage to all uninsured
residents with fees paid through a combination of city funding and individual contribu-
tions based on an income sliding scale. San Francisco Admin Code § 14.2 (2006). Second,
the ordinance establishes an employer spending requirement for medium and large busi-
nesses that operate within city and county limits. The spending requirement establishes
two options for employers: they can provide direct insurance to uninsured employees or
pay into the city plan. Id at §§ 14.1(7), 14.3(a). In 2009, the spending requirement was
$1.85 an hour for large businesses (100 or more employees) and $1.23 an hour for medium
businesses (20-99 employees). Ken Jacobs, San Francisco Healthcare Security Ordinance,
UC Berkeley Center for Lab Rsch and Educ 2 (2009), available at <labor
center.berkeley.edu/healthpolicy/sf-security-ordinance.pdf> (last visited Apr 14, 2009).
The ordinance was upheld against a challenge by a business trade association on the
ground of ERISA preemption. See Golden Gate Restaurant Association v City and County
of San Francisco, 546 F3d 639 (9th Cir 2008). The case is on appeal to the Supreme
Court.
187 LA Admin Code § 10.43.3.D.
18 Id at §§ 10.43.3.A, B.
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ment by sourcing public contracts to companies with good track
records that agree to maintain standards and operate with
transparency.
4. Influencing labor supply.
Some of the initiatives seek not merely to affect labor stan-
dards for already employed workers, but to actually shape the
labor pool and channel disadvantaged job seekers into career
paths that hold out the potential for higher paying, unionized
jobs. In this way, the initiatives seek not just to suppress low-
wage work, but to create the infrastructure for disadvantaged
workers to access high-wage jobs.18 9 The CRA Construction Ca-
reers and Project Stabilization Policy, with its local hiring re-
quirement, is the clearest example of this type of initiative. This
policy seeks to direct jobs in CRA-subsidized projects to low-
income residents who live in the communities where develop-
ment occurs. By requiring that developers take affirmative steps
to facilitate the training and placement of local residents, the
policy aims to expand the pool of eligible workers by equipping
community members with the skills necessary to engage in
project work. Because the policy also requires that CRA projects
enter into project labor agreements with unions, the local hiring
requirement operates as a way to funnel local workers into union
apprentice programs and ultimately unionized construction
jobs-thus growing the pool of unionized workers. Other initia-
tives that include local hiring provisions are CBAs and the Clean
Trucks Program. 190
5. Reframing organized labor's commitments.
As the local hiring model suggests, low-wage worker initia-
tives are often designed to deliver concrete economic benefits to
workers outside of the union fold. At times, this is because the
initiatives are driven by nonunion groups seeking to protect non-
union workers-as in the case of NDLON and the Home Im-
provement Stores Ordinance. However, even when the unions
are central actors in the initiative campaigns, it is clear that an
189 Rogers, 34 Indus Rel at 377 (cited in note 170).
190 Los Angeles also has enacted a First Source Hiring Ordinance that requires com-
panies with city contracts over $25 thousand with a term greater than three months
(excluding "construction contracts for a public work of improvement") to post notices of
job openings with first-source referral organizations and agree to interview qualified
applicants from those organizations. LA Admin Code §§ 10.44.1, 10.44.2.
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important objective is to recast the image of organized labor as
an advocate for working people more broadly-and not just a
partisan of union members. 191 The labor-backed initiatives there-
fore seek to extend the base of political support for unions-by
demonstrating that they can deliver benefits to a broad range of
community members-in order to overcome the negative stereo-
type of labor as a special interest group and improve long-term
prospects for increasing union density. As LAANE's director ex-
plained in connection with the living wage campaign, the goal of
community-labor activism is to "meet the needs of non-unionized
workers, communities and investment-starved neighborhoods for
good jobs and mobilize their often untapped resources; and focus
not just on winning union recognition at a particular site but to
create family-supportive jobs for Los Angeles's working people-
without abandoning the goal of unionizing specific workplac-
es."192 Other examples of organized labor's attempts to blur the
lines between unionized and nonunionized workers include:
CBAs, which create living wage and local hiring goals affecting
nonunionized workers in sectors such as entertainment, restau-
rant, and retail services; the LAX Enhancement Zone Ordinance,
which raises wages for all Century Corridor hotel workers ir-
respective of union affiliation; the Sweat-Free Procurement Or-
dinance, which does the same for city apparel contractors; and
the CRA Construction Careers and Project Stabilization Policy,
which seeks to transition nonunionized, low-skill workers to
higher-paying employment.
6. Forging new alliances.
While low-wage worker initiatives can send a political mes-
sage about organized labor's commitment to nonunionized work-
ers, they can also be used to create new and sustainable linkages
among progressive groups-some of which have historically been
at odds. In the Los Angeles context, there appears to be a clear
effort to organize coalitions that transcend political fault lines.
This is perhaps most apparent in the development of labor-
environmental alliances. Unions and environmental groups have
often clashed over labor's support for development, which creates
jobs, even though it may degrade the environment.1 93 A number
191 See Rogers, 34 Indus Rel at 373 (cited in note 170).
192 Khalil and Hinson, The Los Angeles Living Wage Campaign at 18 (cited in note
23).
193 See Brian K. Obach, Labor and the Environmental Movement: The Quest for Corn-
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of low-wage worker initiatives, by contrast, are specifically
crafted to bring unions and environmental groups together
around shared concerns-promoting a new "blue-green" alliance.
The LAX CBA, for example, saw collaboration between the SEIU
and Teamsters (which sought to support job training, local hir-
ing, and living wage requirements in connection with jobs
created by the airport expansion) and the California Environ-
mental Rights Alliance, CBE, Environmental Defense, and the
NRDC (which were concerned with mitigating environmental
hazards associated with the expansion, such as noise and air pol-
lution). The Clean Trucks Program again brought labor and en-
vironmental groups together around the goal of unionizing
truckers and reducing pollution at the port. LAANE's Grocery
Reinvestment Act campaign also attempts to join unions con-
cerned with the availability and quality of grocery jobs with en-
vironmentalists concerned with food security and public health.
Additionally, as we suggested above, most of the low-wage
worker initiatives seek to enlist support from the progressive
wing of the religious community by focusing on poverty and in-
equality as moral issues (and thus trying to overcome the divi-
sive power of social issues like gay marriage and abortion). The
initiatives also make an effort to overcome the legacy of racial
exclusion and xenophobia that has marred union practice in the
past, evident most recently in the AFL-CIO endorsement of the
1986 employer sanction regime of immigration enforcement. New
labor activists seek to cultivate ties with immigrants and work-
ers of color, and this impulse is on display in the Los Angeles
initiatives, which generally target industries with high concen-
trations of both groups. For example, the campaign for the LAX
Enhancement Zone Ordinance emphasized the fact that many
airport-area hotel workers lived in the communities surrounding
LAX, which are predominantly Latino and African American. 194
In an effort to build alliances with communities of color, many of
the coalitions incorporated strong representation from immi-
grant and civil rights groups: the Los Angeles Living Wage Coa-
lition (California Immigrant Workers Association); Figueroa Cor-
ridor Coalition for Economic Justice (Central American Resource
Center, CHIRLA, and El Rescate); Construction Careers Initia-
mon Ground (MIT 2004).
194 Century Corridor Commission on Jobs, Tourism and Communities, Report: Oppor-
tunity for All: Creating Shared Prosperity in the Gateway to Los Angeles 10 (Apr 25,
2006).
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tive Coalition (Southern Christian Leadership Conference); Coa-
lition for Clean and Safe Ports (CHIRLA, Hermandad Mexicana
Latinoamericana, Mexican American Political Association,
NAACP); and the Alliance for Healthy and Responsible Grocery
Stories (Asian Pacific American Labor Alliance, IDEPSCA, Ko-
rean Immigrant Workers Advocates).
D. Framing
There is a large academic literature that debates the effec-
tiveness of mobilizing legal rights as a means to advance the in-
terests of less powerful social groups. 195 Within labor law, some
scholars have suggested that the rights revolution undercut the
labor movement by focusing on individual rather than collective
grievances, 196 while others have argued that the enforcement of
employment rights-for example, the right to minimum wage or
the right to be free from discrimination in the workplace-can
serve as a spur to worker collective action.1 97
An interesting feature of the Los Angeles low-wage worker
initiatives is that, in the main, they do not seek to advance indi-
vidual rights enforcement regimes. Instead, they create different
types of legal regimes that fall into two categories. On one side
are those initiatives that establish legal frameworks designed to
create bargaining environments within which labor groups may
effectively organize and negotiate benefits for workers.1 98 The
best example of this type of initiative is the Los Angeles Super-
stores Ordinance, which sets up a framework for assessing eco-
nomic impacts as a starting point for discussions about how to
maximize the benefits of big-box retail while minimizing its
costs. As such, the ordinance requires that Wal-Mart opponents
gather evidence demonstrating the costs of big-box retail borne
by particular communities and offer proposals to mitigate such
costs. This means that community groups will have to monitor
195 See, for example, Michael W. McCann, Rights at Work: Pay Equity Reform and the
Politics of Legal Mobilization (Chicago 1994); Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope:
Can Courts Bring About Social Change? (Chicago 1991); Stuart A. Scheingold, The Poli-
tics of Rights: Lawyers, Public Policy, and Political Change (Michigan 2004).
196 See Lichtenstein, State of the Union at 178-211 (cited in note 3).
197 See Gordon, Suburban Sweatshops at 148-84 (cited in note 15); Sachs, 29 Cardozo
L Rev 2707-2721 (cited in note 4).
198 See William H. Simon, Solving Problems vs. Claiming Rights: The Pragmatist
Challenge to Legal Liberalism, 46 Wm & Mary L Rev 127, 181-86 (2004) (discussing the
emergence of a pragmatic approach to solving social problems characterized by an em-
phasis on processes of "stakeholder negotiation" in which affected groups come together to
bargain over the terms of reform).
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proposed developments and provide rigorous empirical documen-
tation of potential impacts. This process is unlikely to completely
block a big-box project because the ordinance permits project ap-
proval so long as any adverse material impacts are mitigated
(though Wal-Mart may opt not to incur the mitigation costs).
Nevertheless, the system requires bargaining between Wal-Mart
and labor and community stakeholders over the terms of entry,
with one possible outcome a CBA, which would include private
contractual provisions mandating specific mitigation efforts by
Wal-Mart.
CBAs, while creating some provisions enforceable by com-
munity groups, also set up ongoing bargaining frameworks, as
our previous discussion of the living wage provision in the Figue-
roa Corridor CBA highlights. Recall that the living wage provi-
sion in that agreement created a 70 percent living wage goal for
the Staples Center development project and, instead of imposing
sanctions for the developer's failure to meet the goal, established
a series of steps designed to allow the coalition to monitor and
provide input into the developer's tenant selection. Other exam-
ples of bargaining-forcing initiatives include the Home Improve-
ment Stores Ordinance, which allows the city to require that big-
box home improvement stores submit a mitigation plan that pro-
vides suitable space for day laborers; the Port of Los Angeles
Clean Trucks Program, which-by mandating a redesignation of
truckers as employees-attempts to create the conditions for
eventual collective bargaining; and the proposed Grocery Rein-
vestment Act, which would in theory create a CUP process allow-
ing input by labor and community groups into grocery siting de-
cisions in order to promote the development of more stores in
low-income and underserved neighborhoods.
The other category of low-wage worker initiatives creates
new legal rights but places the burden of enforcement on local
government rather than individual workers. The Los Angeles
Living Wage Ordinance exemplifies this approach. Although the
ordinance does, in fact, provide that individual employees may
bring enforcement actions against employers for failure to pay
the living wage rate (and for retaliation and willful violations),199
the more significant incentive for employer compliance comes
through the city's power to terminate employer contracts and
debar offending employers from future city contracting opportun-
199 LA Admin Code § 10.37.6(a).
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ities.200 The Sweat-Free Procurement Ordinance establishes a
similar framework, while the CRA Construction Careers and
Project Stabilization Policy places enforcement authority for local
hiring in the CRA itself.20 1
Another important feature of the initiatives we describe is
that they are generally framed in terms that do not sound direct-
ly in traditional labor and employment law. Rather than em-
phasize workers' rights or collective action, they are careful to
use concepts that break with conventional labor movement rhe-
toric. For instance, campaigns for CBAs emphasize the need for
developers that receive public subsidies to give back to the com-
munities in which they build. The Superstores Ordinance was
framed around eliminating economic "blight"; the Home Im-
provement Stores Ordinance around mitigating a "nuisance"; and
the Grocery Reinvestment Act around reversing grocery store
"redlining." The Clean Trucks Program emphasized the envi-
ronmental aspect of the campaign over the labor impact. And
even those initiatives focused directly on raising employment
standards deployed new rhetorical concepts designed to reframe
labor struggles in more sympathetic terms: the "living wage" and
"sweat-free" movements being the most important examples.
E. Impact
In the end, the Los Angeles initiatives must be judged by
how they have impacted low-wage workers. How successful have
they been in improving conditions in Los Angeles's low-wage
markets? To adequately answer this question would require
more information than we have at our disposal at this stage. It
would also require that we engage in the difficult task of compar-
ing the outcomes of very different types of initiatives across a set
of standardized metrics. We do not undertake this task here, but
rather suggest a framework for thinking about the initiatives'
impact. Table 3 lists the initiatives, describes the terms of their
application, and summarizes the evidence of impact we were able
to obtain from public reports and assessments conducted by the
parties involved.
200 Id at § 10.37.6(d).
201 Construction Careers and Project Stabilization Policy § VII (cited in note 101).
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TABLE 3: APPLICATION AND IMPACT OF LOW-WAGE WORKER INITIATIVES
Initiative Application Impact
LA Living Wage Ord. * Employers with city service * Ordinance raised pay (directly and indirectly)
contracts over $25,000, in approximately 9,600 jobs
lessees/llcensees on city property, • Most jobs covered by the ordinance were at
or city financial assistance airports and most in firms that were service
recipients required to pay contractors of city or airlines
employees living wage rate * Ordinance imposed mandatory wage increase
that raised pay for 7,700 jobs by an average of
$2,600 per year; it also caused firms to provide
nonmandated raises that increased the pay of
1,900 workers by an average of $1,300 per year
Minimal job loss reported (estimated at 112
jobs) due to increased wage requirement
Figueroa * Developer required to make * All permanent jobs in phase 1 of development
Corridor reasonable efforts to meet 70% meet living wage standards
Cmty. living wage goal for project • 50% of jobs in phase 1 of development meet
Benefits • Developer required to fund First local hiring requirements
Agreement Source Referral System and • As of 2006, developer had provided $62,000 in
project employers agree to make seed funding to support job training program
efforts to hire local residents from
the System
LAX Cmty. * Airport contractors, lessees, and * Federal Aviation Administration approval was
Cmty. Benefits licensees required to meet local granted for the local hiring provision, the
Benefits Agreement hiring goals implementation of which was deemed "in
Agreements Airport required to provide $15 progress" as of 2007
million over 5 years for job * As of 2007, the Federal Aviation
training Administration had not yet approved the job
training provision
Grand * Employers agreed to 30% local * Estimated to create 29,000 construction and
Avenue hiring goal (which includes a 10% 5,900 permanent jobs, which would equate to
Cmty. at-risk hiring goal) for 8,700 local hires for construction and 1,770
Benefits construction and permanent jobs local hires for permanent jobs
Agreement * Developer required to pay * Estimated to create 5,900 permanent living
$500,000 for job training wage jobs
All permanent jobs subject to * Because of recession, no development has yet
living wage policy started
Superstores Ord. * Big-box retail stores with * No Wal-Mart Supercenters have opened in Los
groceries required to undertake Angeles
economic impact report and * In 2007 union contract negotiations with Los
mitigate negative economic Angeles-area groceries, the UFCW won the
impacts as a condition of project repeal of a two-tier employment structure
approval implemented in 2003
Sweat-Free Proc. Ord. City contractors required to * Not available
comply with applicable laws and
submit to monitoring
Apparel contractors required to
pay "procurement living wage"
LAX Enhancem't Zone Ord. * Requires hotels in LAX area to - 4 of 13 LAX-area hotels signed union contracts
pay living wage rate covering 1,000 workers, which LAANE reports
will amount to over $12 million in additional
wages through 2012
Home lmprov't Stores Ord. * At city's discretion, big-box home a As a result of recession, there have been no
improvement stores required to sites created, although Home Depot has
establish sites for day laborers, thirteen proposed stores that will require
when necessary to accommodate compliance with the ordinance
their job-seeking, as a condition
of project approval
CRA Constr. Careers & * Projects with more than $500,000 * Forecast to create 5,000 jobs for local residents
Project Stabilization Policy in public improvement funds or over the next five years hut the recession has
$1 million in CRA subsidies stalled development and there is no evidence of
required to comply with local current impact
hiring provisions targeting local
residents and disadvantaged
workers
Clean Trucks Program * Trucking companies required to * Forecast to convert approximately 15,000
enter concession agreements to truckers to employees and raise their wages by
access port estimated 40%, resulting in increased trucker
Under agreements, trucking income of approximately $175 million annually
companies required to transition * Legal challenges make program
drivers to employees, meet local implementation uncertain
hiring goals, and retrofit or
replace trucks to meet
environmental standards
Grocery Reinv. Act * Policy has not been finalized * Not available
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As Table 3 suggests, the criteria for assessing impact de-
pends on the way in which the goals of the various initiatives are
understood. Where the initiative's goal is to increase wages, im-
pact is amenable to direct measurement. According to the study
done of the Los Angeles Living Wage Ordinance, nearly 9,600
workers received pay increases as a result of the ordinance; most
covered jobs were at the Los Angeles or Ontario airports and
most were in firms that were service contractors to the city or the
airlines. 20 2 Approximately 7,700 workers received mandatory
raises that averaged $2,600 per year, for a total aggregate pay
increase of roughly $20 million. 20 3 An estimated 1,900 workers
also received nonmandated "indirect" wage increases (to main-
tain wage differentials at their firms) that averaged $1,300, for a
total aggregate increase of nearly $2.5 million. 20 4 The study
found that covered employers did not significantly cut jobs in
response to the higher wage requirement, estimating that only
112 jobs were lost as a result of the ordinance. 205 No comparable
study has yet been done of the LAX Enhancement Zone Ordin-
ance; however, in that case, its impact may also be measured by
the extent to which LAX-area hotels have become unionized in
its wake. According to LAANE, four of the area's thirteen hotels
have been unionized since the Coalition for a New Century cam-
paign began, raising the wages of approximately one thousand
workers by over $12 million through 2012.206 With respect to the
Clean Trucks Program, proponents claimed that based on wage
data, the redesignation of approximately fifteen thousand truck-
ers from independent contractors to employees would raise their
average annual income by approximately $175 million.20 7 How-
ever, this increase may not be realized because of the trucking
companies' legal challenge, which has blocked implementation
thus far.
Of the remaining initiatives for which we have information,
a few general observations can be made. For one, it is important
to note that all (CBAs, the Superstores Ordinance, the Home Im-
202 Fairris, et al, Examining the Evidence at 2 (cited in note 36).
203 Id at 43.
204 Id at 45.
205 Id at 2.
206 Century Corridor Commission on Jobs, Tourism and Communities, Report: Oppor-
tunity for All: Creating Shared Prosperity in the Gateway to Los Angeles 4 (cited in note
194); LAANE, About the New Century Campaign, available at <http://laane.orgl> (last
visited Aug 5, 2009).
207 LAANE, The Road to Shared Prosperity at 15 (cited in note 65).
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provement Stores Ordinance, and the CRA Construction Careers
and Project Stabilization Policy) are tied to the development
process-and thus are subject to uncertainty based on fluctua-
tions in development cycles. Because of the economic downturn,
some of the initiatives have had no impact because no develop-
ment has occurred. This is true of the Home Improvement Stores
Ordinance. Because of the economic downturn, Home Depot has
been slow to move forward on development plans. As a result,
there are currently no day labor sites that have been created un-
der the ordinance, although Home Depot has thirteen proposed
stores pending that will require compliance with the CUP
process. 208 Stalled development has also affected the CRA Con-
struction Careers and Project Stabilization Policy, which was
forecast to create five thousand jobs for local residents, but has
proceeded more slowly than anticipated.
No development has occurred under the Superstores Ordin-
ance either, but that appears less related to economic conditions
and more a result of the ordinance itself. Specifically, Wal-Mart
has chosen not to go through the economic impact report process
created by the Superstores Ordinance as a condition of develop-
ment. As we suggested above, that may be counted as a victory
for its proponents: by keeping Wal-Mart Supercenters out of Los
Angeles, unionized grocery workers gained leverage to negotiate
a better collective bargaining agreement in 2007.
The CBAs have been differentially affected by economic con-
ditions based on when the development was approved. The CBA
associated with the Grand Avenue development, which received
final project approval in 2007, has been most impacted by the
recession, which has prevented any development to date. When
established, the Grand Avenue CBA was forecast to create twen-
ty-nine thousand construction jobs, approximately 30 percent of
which (8,700) would go to local residents and at-risk individuals
under the local hiring provisions. 0 9 The CBA was also forecast to
create 5,900 permanent living wage jobs, approximately 30 per-
cent of which (1,770) would go to local residents and at-risk indi-
208 Email from Victor Narro, Project Director, UCLA Downtown Labor Center, to Scott
Cummings, Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law (June 25, 2009) (on file with the au-
thor).
209 Grand Avenue Project, Summary of Community Benefits Attachment H at 1, avail-
able at <http://www.crala.org/internet-siteJMeetingstupload/01042007-l.pdf> (last visited
Aug 27, 2009).
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viduals.210 However, because no development has yet com-
menced, there has been no progress made on CBA compliance.
The LAX CBA, approved by the city in 2004, has also been
slow to proceed, less for economic reasons, but rather because of
the relationship between the city-owned airport and Federal
Aviation Administration ("FAA") regulators who have the power
to approve certain airport expenditures and programs. As of
2007, Los Angeles World Airports-the city entity that owns and
operates the airport facility-reported that the promised alloca-
tion of $15 million in job training funds had been blocked by the
failure to gain FAA approval and that the local hiring provisions,
which had been approved, were still "in progress."211
The most substantial progress has been made on the Figue-
roa Corridor CBA, which was signed in 2001 (with final project
approval following in 2005). The L.A. Live project officially
opened in 2007 and completion of the third (and final) phase of
development-which includes theatres, hotels, and residences-
is scheduled for 2010. Phase one of the development was com-
pleted in 2007 with the opening of Nokia Theatre, a 7,100-seat
theatre that hosts events such as the American Music Awards
and the Emmys. According to the developer, all of the jobs in the
Nokia Theatre meet the living wage requirements of the CBA
and half of the jobs are held by local residents in compliance with
the local hiring requirement. 212 There is no information availa-
ble, however, on CBA compliance for phase two of the develop-
ment, which included restaurants and entertainment venues
(such as The GRAMMY Museum, ESPN Zone, The Farm of Be-
verly Hills, Lawry's, and Starbucks) that are in industry sectors
generally associated with lower wage rates. With respect to the
local hiring and job training provisions of the CBA, a 2006 Status
Update from the coalition stated that a job training program was
established in August 2003 and that the developer had provided
$62 thousand (out of a promised total of $100 thousand) in seed
funding to support the program. 213
210 Id. The CBA provides that "[a]ll permanent jobs [are] subject to CRA's Living Wage
Policy, including jobs provided by Project tenants, i.e. restaurants, grocery store and
retail outlets." Id at 2.
211 Los Angeles World Airports, LAX Master Plan, Community Benefits Agreement
(CBA) 2007 Annual Progress Report 12-13 (cited in note 96).
212 Telephone Interview with Martha Saucedo, Vice President of Community Affairs,
AEG Worldwide (Aug 26, 2009).
213 L.A. Live, Community Benefits Program, Status Update (March 2006), available at
http://www.edf.orgldocuments/5196-LALiveCBAupdate.pdf.
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F. Challenge
The advent of low-wage worker initiatives as a local labor
strategy raises the crucial challenge of achieving scale. How are
local initiatives replicated and extended to different cities with
distinct legal regimes and political dynamics? Is localism a viable
national labor strategy? Our research cannot answer these ques-
tions, but it does reveal the emergence of national networks of
community and labor activists that are attempting to coordinate
campaigns and share information. The existence of these net-
works does not overcome many of the challenges of localism-
including the risk of inconsistent standards and the absence of
regulation in localities that lack a strong labor presence. Howev-
er, by facilitating the exchange of information, the networks may
allow activists to more easily learn about successful models,
avoid mistakes, and draw upon allies for technical assistance and
resource support. There are a number of developing networks
that relate to the Los Angeles initiatives.
The living wage movement, with nearly 140 living wage or-
dinances passed nationwide, has been one of the most successful
national efforts to improve conditions for low-wage workers. In
terms of national coordination, it has been particularly success-
ful in disseminating a basic legal model that connects living
wage requirements to service contracting. This success is attri-
butable, in part, to the effectiveness of national intermediary
groups that facilitate networking and the exchange of substan-
tive and strategic information. The most prominent is ACORN's
Living Wage Resource Center, which provides a comprehensive
list of living wage campaigns, offers links to other living wage
groups, and publishes information on running effective cam-
paigns. 214 The Brennan Center's Economic Justice Project (which
recently merged with the National Employment Law Project) has
also played an important role in providing legal and technical
assistance to support living wage drives. 215
A range of formal and informal networks have also devel-
oped to draw attention to big-box mobilizations across the coun-
try and foster greater coordination. 216 On the legal front, lawyers
214 See ACORN, Living Wage Resource Center, available at <http://www.livingwage
campaign.org/> (last visited Aug 5, 2009).
215 See Brennan Center for Justice, Living Wage Laws, available at <http://www.
brennancenter.org/contentpagesliving-wage-laws> (last visited Aug 5, 2009).
216 See Steven Greenhouse, Opponents of Wal-Mart to Coordinate Efforts, NY Times
20 (Apr 3, 2005).
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active on the Los Angeles Superstores campaign have developed
expertise that has positioned them as a valuable resource for na-
tional groups. Those lawyers have served as nodes of information
exchange, giving advice to community-labor groups around the
country on drafting big-box ordinances. 21 7 The Brennan Center
for Justice has again lent crucial legal support in drafting ordin-
ances and defending them from legal attack.218 Labor groups at
both the local and national level have played critical roles in de-
vising ordinances and deliberately exporting them to new loca-
tions. LAANE, in particular, has become a key actor in promot-
ing and coordinating anti-Wal-Mart campaigns, producing a re-
source guide that outlines a range of legal and organizing res-
ponses to Wal-Mart development and that distills the collective
experience of community-labor groups around the country. 219 The
California Partnership for Working Families was created with
strong union support to provide national-level technical assis-
tance and coordination for community-labor alliances in an effort
to "build community and reshape regional economies to trans-
form the lives of workers and communities. '" 220 The Partnership
has been active in supporting Wal-Mart campaigns and helping
devise policy tools such as community impact reports.221
The CBA movement has followed a similar trajectory. After
the success of the Figueroa Corridor CBA, there have been ef-
forts to deepen organizational connections, expand community
resources, and develop higher-level coordination in order to exert
a sustained political influence over development decisions.
LAANE has provided some coordination of campaigns in the Los
Angeles area, while the Partnership for Working Families has
also played a crucial national leadership role: developing a CBA
handbook, keeping a list of current agreements, and providing
technical assistance to campaigns around the country.222 Recent-
ly, the Partnership launched the Community Benefits Law Cen-
ter with two lawyers who provide assistance on CBA campaigns
217 Cummings, 95 Cal L Rev at 1983 (cited in note 9).
218 See Brennan Center for Justice, Job Standards & Accountability for Large Retail-
ers, available at <http://www.brennancenter.org/contentlpages/job-standards-
accountability-for large-retailers> (last visited July 7, 2009).
219 See Gray-Barkan, 35 Soc Pol at 37-38 (cited in note 111).
220 The Partnership for Working Families, Vision, available at <http://www.
communitybenefits.org/article.php?list=type&type=15> (last visited Aug 5, 2009).
221 Cummings, 95 Cal L Rev at 1984 (cited in note 9).
222 The Partnership for Working Families, Community Benefits Agreements, available
at <http://www.communitybenefits.org/article.php?list-type&type=39> (last visited Aug
5, 2009).
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across the country. 223 Good Jobs First, a national organization
that has focused on tracking development subsidies, has also op-
erated as an information clearinghouse for campaigns promoting
"accountable development. ' 224 In addition, there have been con-
ferences, academic journal articles, and websites devoted to shar-
ing information about CBAs.225 One consequence of these efforts
has been that developers in Los Angeles-and across the coun-
try-now recognize that negotiating over community benefits is
part of the overall redevelopment process. As CBAs become more
familiar, however, some have questioned whether they have been
co-opted in certain instances by developers and city officials who
are able to gain approval for projects by negotiating agreements
with preferred groups that may not reflect the full range of com-
munity concerns. 226
As this overview suggests, low-wage worker advocacy net-
works are developing in a number of areas, although they still
remain relatively decentralized and fluid. A central challenge for
low-wage worker activists will be not just to sustain their
growth, but also to link them together across substantive areas
in order to promote a coherent national agenda, and to build
stronger ties to organized labor and other progressive move-
ments in order to expand their scope and power.
CONCLUSION
This Article has surveyed the architecture of local govern-
ment initiatives that advocates have pursued in Los Angeles to
address the needs of low-wage workers. It is an effort to trace the
connections between local government power and low-wage
worker reforms, catalogue what has worked and what has not,
and provide possible templates for initiatives in other jurisdic-
tions. In so doing, we have concentrated on a series of low-wage
worker initiatives advanced during an era of strong political con-
223 See Community Benefits Law Center, Staff, available at <http://www.
communitybenefits.org/legal/staff.html> (last visited Aug 5, 2009).
224 See Good Jobs First, An Overview of Accountable Development, available at
<http://www.goodjobsfirst.org/accountable-developmentloverview.cfm> (last visited Aug
5, 2009).
225 See, for example, Community Benefits Agreements, 17 J of Affordable Housing &
Community Dev L 1-175 (Fall 2007IWinter 2008); Community Benefits Agreements,
available at <http://communitybenefits.blogspot.com> (last visited Aug 5, 2009).
226 See Julian Gross, Community Benefits Agreements: Definitions, Values, and Legal
Enforceability, 17 J of Affordable Housing & Community Dev L 35, 41 (Fall 2007/Winter
2008).
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servatism at the federal level. The perception by labor activists of
limited opportunities for national reform during this period helps
to explain some of the impetus for this local approach. The ad-
vent of a federal administration more amenable to low-wage
worker and immigrant rights has raised hope among labor activ-
ists that new laws and regulatory policies will alleviate some of
the worst forms of abuse. This may pull more advocacy resources
toward the federal level and dissipate some of the energy-and
even need-for locally targeted efforts. Yet it remains to be seen
whether significant labor reform will pass and, if so, how far it
will go. In the meantime, the economic crisis has further destabi-
lized the economic environment of low-wage workers, eliminating
jobs and making them more vulnerable to exploitation. Invaria-
bly, federal labor law reform-should it come-will not be able to
comprehensively change low-wage markets, while local advocates
and decision makers will be well-positioned to adapt policies to
the unique structure of local conditions. As low-wage worker ad-
vocacy moves forward, it therefore seems likely that local initia-
tives that complement the federal regulatory structure will con-
tinue to be part of the movement to reshape low-wage work.
In conclusion, it bears emphasizing that we have chosen to
focus our analysis on how local government law has been turned
to labor-related ends and the implications of locally targeted ad-
vocacy for the contemporary labor movement. As such, we have
not probed the implications of low-wage worker initiatives for
local government law itself. It seems clear, however, that just as
local government law has been used to reshape labor, labor is
changing local government law-which has been stretched
beyond its traditional focus on service provision and land use
regulation to reach into the workplace in ways that suggest a
potentially significant transformation. How broad this transfor-
mation is and what implications it has for local government
planning are important avenues of future inquiry. What seems
clear at this point is that as greater attention is paid to the sub-
national region as a central locus of economic activity, local gov-
ernments will play a larger role in regulating not just the scope
and nature of economic development, but the terms on which its
benefits are distributed in the workplace setting.
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